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Schizophrenia, it might be this psychiatric term that enters one’s mind when 
an amateur observer is asked to describe the contemporary nature of major 
American political parties in one word. Such an uncomplimentary connotation has 
its rationale, and, at first sight, the American party system indeed may remotely 
remind of this ambivalent psychological disorder. Its “Jekyll and Hyde” character 
can be illustrated by the simple fact that, for example, before the 2000 presidential 
election, according to a Gallup Poll, 67 percent of the electorate supported the 
idea of a third party, but, at the very election, only 3.8 percent actually voted for a 
third party candidate.1 Also, Americans commonly complain that “there ain’t a 
dime’s worth of a difference between the political parties”2 and they even compare 
them to two famous brothers from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in the Wonderland -  
Tweedledum and Tweedledee; however, if we analyze the floor voting in recent 
Congresses, we can discern unprecedented high partisan voting patterns which 
demonstrate deep loyalties of the individual congressmen and senators to their 
parent party. Moreover, there exists a common feeling of apathy among American 
voters because, according to them, political parties are too remote, and they do 
not address their needs but, at the same time, over two thirds of the electorate 
associate themselves with either Democratic or Republican Party and the number 
of independents is relatively low.
These obvious discrepancies seem to perplex even political scientists, as 
they come to contradictory conclusions about American political parties -  some 
claim that they appear in the stage of decline and decomposition, such as Martin 
P. Wattenberg in The Decline of American Political Parties 1952-1984 (1986) or 
William J. Crotty in American Parties in Decline (1980), while others celebrate their 
resurgence and boom, such as Larry J. Sabato in The Party's Just Begun: 
Shaping Political Parties for America's Future (1988) or Xandra Kayden and Eddie 
Mahe, Jr. in The Party Goes on: The Persistence of the Two-Party System in the 
United States (1985).
1 Bibby, John F.2003. Politics, Parties, and Elections in America. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning,
P’3
This well-known phrase was coined by a former governor of Alabama and American Independent Party 
presidential candidate George Wallace so as to show his antipathy towards the Democratic and Republican 
parties
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The goal of this thesis is to unravel the mystery of American party system and 
to explore its intricate maze, while focusing on different aspects that eventuate this 
illusive “schizophrenia.“ I try to answer the question of whether the contemporary 
parties decline or thrive, and how their organization, structure of electoral support 
and behavior in the government have changed throughout their historical 
development as their presence can be best understood through their anamneses.
Chapter 1 defines the notion of political party and introduces the Key-Sorauf 
triad, which becomes a dominant approach towards political parties throughout 
this thesis. Chapter 2 outlines historical development of American political parties 
from the 1790s until 1932, tracing continuity and discontinuity of the four distinct 
party systems, and also contemplates rise and transformation of the “mass-based“ 
party. Chapter 3 analyzes the recent trends in the party-in-government, while 
focusing mainly on Rohde’s conception of the so-called “conditional party 
government.“ Chapter 4 deals with structural innovations that were integrated into 
the party-as-organization in the 1960s and 1970s, while also describing the rise of 
a new form of political party in service to its candidates. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
seeming decline of the political party in the electorate and it also deals with 
correlation between changing political and social environment and the occurrence 
of a new American voter in the 1960s. The conclusion is devoted to assessment 
whether present parties find themselves in decline or resurgence.
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1. Tripartite Nature of American Political Parties
In the context of the United States, a political party, per se, is characterized 
by high complexity and heterogeneity and political scientists find it hard to 
approach it in a uniform manner as it can be compared to a diverse mosaic 
consisting of many pieces just “begging“ to be analyzed, which results in a great 
multitude of its definitions:
A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get power.1
E.E.Schattschneider
In the broadest sense, a political party is a coalition of men seeking to control the governing 
apparatus by legal means. By coalition, we mean a group of individuals who have certain ends in 
common and cooperate with one another to achieve them. By governing apparatus, we mean the 
physical, legal, and institutional equipment which the government uses to carry out its specialized 
role in the division of labor. By legal means, we mean either duly constituted elections or legitimate 
influence.2
Anthony Downs
[A party is] any group however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders 
under a given label.3
Leon Epstein
[A party is] a group organized to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning 
election to public office.4
Joseph Schlesinger
A political party, at least on the American scene, tends to be a “group” of a peculiar sort...A 
fundamental difficulty about the term “political party” is that it is applied without discrimination to 
many types of groups and near-groups...Within the body of voters as a whole, groups are formed 
of persons who regard themselves as party members...Party in this sense of the party-in-the- 
electorate is an amorphous group, yet it has a social senility...In another sense the term may refer 
to the group to the group of more or less professional political workers...At times party denotes 
groups within the government...Often it refers to an entity which rolls into the party-in-the-
1 Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. Party Government, N ew  York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, p.37
2 Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory o f  Dem ocracy, New York:Harper Brunswick, p.24
3 Epstein, Leon. 1967. Political Parties in Western Democracies, New York: Praeger, p.9
4 Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1985. The New American Political Party, American Political Science Review, vol.79, 
p. 1153
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electorate, the professional political group, the party-in-the-legislature, and the party-in-the- 
government...ln truth, this all-encompassing usage has its legitimate applications for all the types 
of groups called party interact more or less closely and at times may be as one.1
V.O. Key
A political party is a group of officeholders, candidates, activists, and voters who identify with a 
group label and seek to elect individuals to public office who run under that label.2
Larry Sabato
Political parties can be seen as coalitions of elites to capture and use political off ice... (But) a 
political party is...more than a coalition. A major political party is an institutionalized coalition, one 
that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures.3
John Aldrich
In spite of this diversity, we can find some common threads in some of the 
aforesaid definitions. Schattschneider, Downs, Schlesinger and Epstein all 
emphasize that the political party is primarily an instrumental organization with the 
goal of winning elections, which entails control of the government and acquisition 
of power. However, V.O.Key, Jr. emphasizes yet another dimension, which does 
not confine only to electoral and governmental structural elements represented by 
office-seekers, office-holders, activists and party members in general, but pertains 
also to voters, thereby pointing out existence of a certain link between the political 
party and ordinary citizen. Such a multi-faceted approach to the political party 
soon found resonance and acclaim within American scholarship, including the 
scholars as Frank J. Sorauf, Larry Sabato or John H. Aldrich. As a result, it has 
become quite a regularity to analyze American political party from the perspective 
of the so-called Key-Sorauf triad which distinguishes three interrelating party 
components, i.e., party-as-organization, party-in-government, and party-in-the- 
electorate.
According to Sorauf, the party-as-organization comprises “formally chosen 
party leaders, the informally anointed ones, the legions of local ward and precinct 
workers, and the members and activists of the party -  that is, all those who give 
their time, money, and skills to the party, whether as leaders or followers.”4 Its
1 Key, V.O., Jr. 1964. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 6th ed , New York:Crowell, pp.163-164
2 Sabato, Larry J. 1988. The P arty’s Just Begun. Shaping Political Parties fo r America's Future, Brown 
College Division: Scott, Foresman and Company, p.26
3 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 283-284
4 Sorauf, Frank J., and Paul Allen Beck. 1988. Party P olitics in America, 6th ed., Glenview: Scott, Foresman 
and Company, p. 10
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main function is the nomination of candidates for office, one which primarily entails 
mobilization of the electoral support. The party-as-organization derives its 
momentum not only from the formal machinery of national and state committees 
and conventions but also from the nature of its informal apparatus, which includes 
hierarchical relations, face-to-face contacts and interactions.
The party-in-government is represented by political actors who have been 
elected to public office under the party’s label, i.e., chief executive and legislative 
office-holders on the state and national level. They make up the most visible and 
influential component of the political party, and the party-as-organization 
possesses only limited means how to exert influence on them. As a consequence, 
the interests of the particular office-holder may sometimes prove to be 
contradictory to those of the party as a whole. It is this discrepancy that shapes 
theoretical foundations for the necessity to treat these two structural party’s 
constituents separately.
Out of all three components, the party-in-the-electorate exhibits the greatest 
vagueness. According to Beck and Hershey, it consists of “the men and women 
who see themselves as Democrats or Republicans: those who feel some degree 
of loyalty to the party, who normally vote for its candidates in primaries and the 
general election, even if they have never set a foot in the party’s headquarters or 
dealt with its leaders and activists.”1 The party-in-the-electorate does not depend 
on the party-as-organization and it is not subject to its control and incentive. Yet 
the party-as-organization is dependent on the party-in-the-electorate, and it must 
continuously woo its supporters since it forms the basis of “the coalitions 
necessary for effective political power in the American political system.”2 The 
party-as-organization is a mass producer of candidates and appeals, destined to 
be consumed by the party-in-the-electorate. Unfortunately for the former, the latter 
is marked by great volatility of tastes and affections. The party-in-the-electorate 
very much influences and participates in the functioning of the party-as- 
organization (e.g. through the system of primary elections), hence it is not just a 
mere external group that needs to be mobilized for winning elections. The 
combination of the party-as-organization and the party-in-the-electorate shapes
1 Beck, Paul Allen, and Marjorie Randon Hershey. 2001. Party Politics in America, 7th Ed., Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers Inc., p.10
2 Sorauf, Frank J., and Paul Allen Beck. 1988. Party Politics in America, 6th ed., Glenview: Scott, Foresman 
and Company, p. 11
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the main identifying feature of American political parties and, as a consequence, 
they are “an open, inclusive, semipublic political organization,“ which differentiates 
them from the predominantly closed character of their European counterparts.1
1 Sorauf, Frank J., and Paul Allen Beck. 1988. Party Politics in Am erica, 6th ed., Glenview: Scott, Foresman 
and Company p. 12
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2. Historical Perspective of American Political Parties
In his noted study entitled A Theory of Critical Elections, V.O.Key, Jr. noticed 
that there exists “a category of elections...in which the decisive results of the 
voting reveal a sharp alteration of pre-existing cleavages within the electorate. 
Moreover, and perhaps this is differentiating characteristic of this sort of election, 
the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for 
several elections.”1 Ever after publication of this article, the concept of critical 
elections has been elaborated upon by many political scientists. American political 
history appears to be a never-ending but more or less regular alternation of two 
political parties in power. Yet there existed certain periods of time (political cycles) 
which witnessed a pronounced pattern in electoral preferences when one political 
party enjoyed the coherent and majority support of voters. The cause of these 
cycles is traditionally labeled by political scholars as electoral realignment. 
Sundquist defines realignment as “a shift in the distribution of basic party 
attachments, as distinct from a temporary alteration of voting behavior.“2 In other 
words, it indicates major and enduring change in affiliation of voters. The elections 
which incur dramatic and long-term turn in party loyalties classically bear the 
attribute ’’critical.” Ever after coinage of this locution by V.O.Key, Jr., political 
scientists have been quarrelling about the classification and identification of critical 
elections. However, there is a wide consensus regarding appearance of critical 
elections in the years 1860, 1896, 1932 and 1968. If we add the pre-party era 
where parties were rather elitist governmental organizations, we get six distinct 
party systems: 1) the Federalist-Republican system (from the early 1790s until 
approximately 1815), 2) the Democratic-Whig system (from the mid-1820s to the 
mid-1850s), 3) the first Republican-Democratic system (from 1860 until 1896), 4) 
the second Republican-Democratic system (from 1896 until 1932), 5) the New 
Deal party system, which arose in 1932 and lasted until 1968, and 6) the Post- 
New Deal party system (1968 until now).3
1 Key, V.O., Jr. 1955. “A  Theory of Critical Elections, ’’Journal o f  Politics, vol. 17, N o .l, p.4
2 Sundquist, James L. 1981. Dynamics o f  the Party System. Rev. ed. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
3 see, for example, Bibby, John F.2003. Politics, Parties, and Elections in Am erica. Belmont: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, pp. 24-39
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The following subchapters deal with basic characteristics of the first four party 
systems through the eyes of the Key-Sorauf triad. I pay particular attention to the 
first two party systems due to their dynamism (i.e. crystallization of the political 
party as such and quick transformations of the party system including rise and fall 
of the Federalist Party and Whig Party). For the purpose of this thesis, I attribute 
these periods as follows -  Era of Party Distrust, Era of Party Fascination, Era of 
Party Manipulation and Era of Party Democratization. The more recent 
developments of political parties are covered in great detail in the remaining part of 
this thesis.
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2.1 Era of Party Distrust
Surprisingly, a political party was more than an unwelcome guest within the 
American political environment and it was treated with greatest contempt and 
suspicion with this antagonistic approach being predominantly apparent in the First 
and Second Congress, where it reached its nadir. This deep-rooted enmity was 
caused by lack of positive experience with political parties as they could not get rid 
of their ominous stigmata originating from the British tradition. The notion of 
political party traditionally merged with and had negative connotations of a faction, 
which, at that time, inherently stood for a clique that placed its own interests higher 
than well-being of the society. James Madison in his Federalist No. 10 defines a 
faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or 
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.“1 This Federalist also illustrates the 
interchangeable character of a faction and political party as Madison warns both 
against “the violence of faction“2 and “rage of party“.3 Also, other Founding Fathers 
showed deep dissatisfaction with the phenomenon of political party. For example, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1789 that “such addiction [to a political party] is the last 
degradation of a free and moral agent. If I could not go to heaven but with a party,
I would not go there at all”4 and Benjamin Franklin cautioned against “the infinite 
mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters.”5 In other words, 
the organization into larger political groupings as such was viewed as necessarily 
inherent upon the natural manifestation of collective egoistic passions which 
contravened and obscured the individual will and led to oppression of non­
participant citizens. As a consequence, the then political leaders perceived political 
party only within the framework of a faction and failed to appreciate the positive 
aspect of political party for the whole community. Another source of anathema in 
relation to the political parties sprang from the dogma that they could undermine
1 Madison, James, Hamilton, Alexander, and Jay, John. 1987. The Federalists Papers, London: Penguin 
Books, p. 123 (No. X),
2 Ibid p. 122 (No. X)
3 Ibid p. 318 (No. L)
4 Quoted in Aldrich, John H. and Ruth H Grant. 1993. ’’The Antifederalists, the First Congress, and the First 
Parties,” The Journal o f  Politics, Volume 55, p. 296
5 Quoted in Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in 
America, Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, p.93
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the national unity, which was regarded to play a crucial factor in the stability of the 
state and constitution.
This traditional conception of political party necessarily poses some 
intriguing questions. If the key politicians in this epoch originally denounced and 
vigorously criticized the phenomenon of political parties immediately after the birth 
of independent American nation, how it is possible that political parties rapidly 
developed to become a vital part of the American political system? What caused 
this sudden change in the collective perception of political parties? Which factors 
stood behind the puzzle of their origination in the anti-party era? And, indeed, the 
rise of political parties in the United States in the 1790s can be interpreted as 
rather an accidental process that flowed from historical and political necessities 
than a result of deliberate actions taken by key political actors of that era. Surely 
enough, the birth of American political parties is more than paradoxical, and it can 
be viewed as a choice of a lesser evil.
American political parties were grudgingly formed due to the chaos and 
instability that haunted the first two Congresses. The roll-call voting failed to have 
any consistent pattern, with Congressmen voting rather randomly and depending 
arbitrarily on agreement and benefits promised by the individual factions.1 In this 
sense, the term faction reflects its modern usage, and it stands for political 
groupings organized around temporary issues and key political actors. This 
situation created a certain circulus vitiosus as the inherent shifting majorities, 
founded upon bargaining or even vote trading, failed to coin a coherent policy, 
which undermined the stability of the “fragile” new-born state and presented 
imminent danger to its future. Inevitably, political leaders soon faced a serious 
dilemma -  how to ensure consistent policy line and win the stable support of the 
individual Congressmen when approving bills. To this cause, political leaders did 
not have any other option but to utilize the lesser evil -  the mechanism of hitherto 
unpopular political parties -  whose raison ďétre was an institutional solution to a 
shifting and fragile majority rule so as to ensure a coherent bloc of support inside 
the Congress for promoted policies.2 Strangely enough, what one could perceive
1 Hoadley, John F. 1980: ’’The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803,” The American  
Political Science Review, vol. 74, p. 760
2 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, p. 77
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with a certain hyperbole rather as an “unwilling bastard“ within the American 
political system would later turn out to be one of its most celebrated idols.
The pre-party era poses yet another question -  why did the United States 
develop a two-party system and not a multi-party system? Hoadley synthetizes 
theoretical conclusions by Hutchinson and Duverger and distinguishes four stages 
in the process of party development -  factionalism, polarization, expansion, and 
institutionalization.1 Naturally, the rise of a two-party system is to be attributed to 
the phase of polarization when the shifting majorities of factionalism transformed 
into more stable and consistent political groupings that fought over enforcement of 
their political agenda. Hoadley explains the rise of such distinct political 
crystallization as based on: appearance of a dominant issue and/or accumulation 
of several cleavages.2 In the case of the United States, both aspects were relevant 
with the former predominating and the latter resulting implicitly from the political 
crux of the matter. The Constitution of the United States displayed great 
vagueness regarding the status of the new federal government and therefore the 
first Congresses played a vital role in allocating and assigning powers and 
functions to it and in shaping the precedent for the future. Aldrich labels the 
contradiction of key political actors, i.e., strong government vs. weak government, 
by the so-called “great principle,“ which basically stood at the fundamental 
polarization of the first political parties in the form of the Federalists (led by 
Alexander Hamilton and John Adams) and the Anti-Federalists (led by Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison).3 The accumulation of cleavages was represented 
by their different views on economic orientation (industry vs. agriculture with the 
intrinsic division between the North and the South), foreign policy (England vs. 
France in relation to the establishment of stronger ties), location of the capital etc.
Alexander Hamilton was the first politician to explore the future bonanza of 
American politics -  the mechanism of political parties since he began to utilize 
party caucuses and the consequential voting majorities to enforce his fiscal plan 
and to coordinate his legislative plans. Jefferson and Madison responded at the 
end of the second Congress by forming an organized opposition, yet the Anti-
1 Hoadley, John F. 1980: ’’The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803,” The American  
Political Science Review, vol. 74, p. 757
2 Ibid
3 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in Am erica, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, p. 72
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Federalist Party was conceived rather in agony, and it, in linguistic terms, 
resembled a patient, who suffered under the yoke of the agent in the form of the 
Federalist Party. Not until formation of intersectional alliance, the creation of party 
press, and the improvement of electoral organization did the minority position of 
the Anti-Federalist Party change.1 By his analysis of roll-call voting in early 
Congresses, Hoadley demonstrates that the first two Congresses had factional 
connotations (in the modern usage of the term), with the political camps being 
arranged regionally, while the third and fourth Congresses already witnessed more 
coherent voting patterns with two stable opposing political groups, when virtually 
every congressmen identifying himself in terms of a Federalist or Anti-Federalist, 
and the index of party cohesion (frequency of voting in favor of the affiliated party) 
exceeding 60 percent. This period, i.e., 1793-1797, can be perceived as a turning 
point in the development of American political system as national politicians 
commonly started to exploit the terra incognita of political parties.
HOUSE SENATE
Figure 2.1. Index of Cohesion, United States Congress, House of Representatives and 
Senate, 1789- 1803 (source Hoadley, John F. 1980: „The Emergence of Political Parties in 
Congress, 1789-1803,” The American Political Science Review, Volume 74, p. 775)
Through the lens of the Key-Sorauf triad, the first political parties functioned 
only as the party-in-government, and hence they may be dubbed as mere 
archetypical distorted images of political parties. The Federalist and Anti-Federalist 
Party (Democratic-Republican Party since 1800) featured rather pragmatic and ad 
hoc quintessence -  to win within the framework of the great principle and avoid
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in Am erica, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, p. 80
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nuisances of voting instability. Moreover, the first political parties and their political 
leaders failed to establish relevant ties with the ordinary voter (this especially 
applied to the Federalist Party) and in a way reminded of Olympian gods, who 
controlled lives of other people but had difficulty addressing them in a broader 
perspective for splendor of their veiled mountain. In other words, they resembled 
detached political organizations and encompassed only a small portion of the 
electorate, thus lacking legitimacy. Also, from an organizational standpoint, the 
functional cohesion of the national, state, and local parties exhibited much 
looseness and deficiency. In short, the time of “real“ political parties embracing all 
elements of the Key-Sorauf triad was yet to come. The elitist nature of the 
Federalist Party eventually precipitated its doom, and the first portent of its decline 
was the election of 1800, when it irrevocably lost the presidency. The swan-song 
for the Federalists was the War of 1812, which definitely sealed their fate owing to 
their previous affiliation with Great Britain. As a consequence, the United States 
for the first and also last time in its history entered into a one-party era. Short as it 
was, the Democratic-Republicans soon split into two factions, hence closing the 
chapter of the first parties.
2.2 Era of Party Fascination
The political parties of the second party system complement the last two 
stages of party development according to Hoadley’s theory, i.e., expansion and 
institutionalization. Under expansion, we may understand massive penetration of 
the political party into the life of ordinary citizens to include them firmly into the 
electoral process, which presupposes the comprehensive creation of local party 
organizations and the growth of the electorate.1 Where the first parties remained 
intrinsically aloof from masses, the second system already brought some fresh air 
of popularization process, especially the reinforcement and extension of ties 
between the political party and the voter.
The key political actor who stood behind this party face-lift and, as though by 
waving of a magic wand, changed the nature of political parties at the end of the 
1820s, was no lesser a man than the ambitious New York politician and future
1 Hoadley, John F. 1980: ’’The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803,” The American  
Political Science Review, vol. 74, p. 757
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president of the United States, Martin van Buren. The unity of the Democratic- 
Republicans found itself shattered in 1824 since heavy struggles over nomination 
of the presidential candidate drove a fatal wedge into the heart of this party. 
However, the unsuccessful contestant, Andrew Jackson, showed his 
determination and responded by creating a mighty tandem with Martin Van Buren, 
the „Little Magician“ from Kinderhook, with the purpose of winning the election of
1828.1 Hence, out of ashes of the Democratic-Republican Party, Martin Van Buren 
constructed his opus magnum - a phenomenon of the mass-based party, one 
which survived in the American political world for more than one hundred years, 
and definitely buried the former peculiar political concept that blended elitism and 
democracy. Originally, Van Buren intended to erect a brand new form of political 
party on the foundations of the old party, yet the achieved result exhibited great 
differences separating both types of political parties.2 If we should apply the Key- 
Sorauf triad, then the mass-based party entailed an unprecedented boom of voter 
mobilization, hence developing the party-in-the-electorate, while the first parties 
confined themselves only to the government. In addition, Van Buren’s Democratic 
Party encompassed middle classes and its rise was deliberately elaborated as 
distinct from the aristocratic and casual character of the first parties.
Several important political, social, and historical factors enabled and 
accelerated the birth of the mass-based party: democratization of the presidential 
election with inherent massive extension of suffrage, rapid development of 
communication and transport channels, which made embracement of the political 
party by masses technically feasible, non-competitive and therefore tedious 
character of the Era of Good Feelings, immense popularity of Andrew Jackson as 
opposed to John Quincy Adams, possibility to integrate cognate factions into one 
identifying whole etc. Van Buren’s plan for voter mobilization proved to be 
extremely successful, and the presidential election turnout more than doubled from
26.5 % in 1824 to 56.3 % in 1828 owing to skillful organization of election
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, p. 99
2 Ibid, p .124
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campaigns including bonfires, parades, markets, rallies, partisan newspapers and 
pamphlets.1
Naturally, the conditio sine qua non for some successful voter mobilization 
and consolidation of voter preferences is party institutionalization or, in other 
words, the development of the party-as-organization. The Democratic Party 
established several structural innovations such as the caucus, more frequent 
utilization of conventions, and integration of state and local factional 
organizations.2 The caucus served as the organizational central brain of the party 
as its goal was to raise resources, coordinate partisan activities and financially 
support state and local political organizations willing to join the cause. A part and 
parcel of popularization of the political party was frequent employment of 
conventions, not a novelty in American politics but rather a theretofore “ostracized“ 
political instrument, the main purpose of which focused on the selection of 
candidates and articulation of policy initiatives. The state and local organizations 
functioned as a communicator of the political message directly to the voter and 
guarantor of its correct interpretation, and they were integrated on the basis of the 
so-called strategic parties hypothesis, i.e., preference was given to those that 
brought the greatest benefit, whether economic or political that resulted in 
heterogeneity of party organization, varying from state to state.3 As a reward for 
their loyalty, the individual party organizations were provided with relatively high 
degree of independence, thereby establishing a relatively long-lasting precedent of 
party decentralization.
Because of his pronounced political stances, Andrew Jackson started to 
gradually lose his unifying quality and, as a result, he became a persona non grata 
within certain political circles. Such political disproportions generated many 
incentives for the constitution of a new partisan body. Indeed, the political “avatar“ 
of dissatisfied cries soon appeared in the form of the Whig Party, thereby 
reinstating the classical two-party system. Unfortunately, the very establishment of 
the Whig Party, bound initially only by opposition to Andrew Jackson and with only
1 Silbey, Joel H. 2002. “From ‘Essential to the Existence of Our Institutions' to ‘Rapacious Enemies of  
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few other things to offer, was greatly hampered by its inherently unsystematic and 
hasty character. Consequently, its candidates ran on a loose platform with hardly 
any organizational mechanisms how to mobilize the electorate, thus failing to 
secure the victory in the 1836 elections.1 Nonetheless, by gradual implementation 
of the structural and mobilization principles of the Democratic Party, the Whig 
Party quickly became rooted in the American party system, which culminated in 
snatching the 1840 presidential election.
The emergence of the highly competitive second two-party system, 
augmented by vast expansion of the party-as-organization and the party-in-the- 
electorate, resulted in extremely high electoral turn-out with straight-ticket voting 
being the regularly recurring case, which means that the electorate would 
consistently retain its partisan preferences with only little respect to presented 
issues or personalities. In an unprecedented manner, the affiliated political party 
ran extremely deep under the skin of the voter, which naturally became reflected in 
high conservatism of party identification. According to Silbey, “their [citizens1] 
commitment to the parties moved beyond instrumentalist calculation of the 
rewards of specific policies or the benefits to be gained from particular 
candidates,“ which implies that the electorate worshipped more the idea of a 
political party than its concrete content.2 If one should label the political mood of 
this period, political idealism would be a good choice, i.e., tendency to ignore 
particularities for idolization of the whole. As a result, political parties hyperbolically 
found themselves in a certain state of mythologization, and the political Aóyoq 
(logos -  reason or logic) was slightly shifted to the background. From this 
perspective, the phenomena of high voter turn-out and straight-ticket voting of this 
period reflect skillful exploitation of the artificially created mythos or cult of political 
parties due to the unprecedented ubiquitous machinery of partisan 
institutionalization. Where the first parties failed (since they were too detached 
from the electorate to create a cult), the second parties succeeded owing to their 
extensive approximation to masses. In other words, affiliation with political parties
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
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virtually acquired a sacred dimension in this period, and the antagonism of the first 
party system was therefore definitely overridden by ingrained adoration.
The political contests in the second party system displayed remarkable 
tightness. The utmost goal of both parties was to mark off their electoral territory 
and draw a thick line between their promoted policies. Each party carefully 
defended and extended its mythos by presentation of its unique and unclichéd 
political program and ostensibly manifested its superiority in relation to the rival 
party, as, naturally, only original political cults can build up loyalties of its devotees. 
The obsessive need of political parties to be different is illustrated by the following 
utterance in the Louisville Journal that claims that parties were “as opposite to 
each other as light and darkness, as knowledge and ignorance.”1 As we can see, 
political parties really prospered in this era.
2.3 Era of Party Manipulation
Both political parties had established an important structural mechanism 
when their members were unconditionally subordinated to the cause of the whole 
partisan body, hence securing that no faction, region, or politicians could become 
dominant and promote their interests to the detriment of other party constituents. 
The purpose of the so-created intersectional alliance was self-evident -  to knit 
heterogeneous components together by means of commonly shared partisan 
principles and to avoid possible ideological splits within the party with the implicit 
goal of keeping the divisive issue of slavery off the party agenda.2
However, in the 1850s, the rising anti-slavery sentiments could not longer be 
smothered, throwing political parties into a highly dilemmatic situation. In the 
classical rational scenario, the appearance of a highly divisive dominant issue in a 
two-party system inherently forces political parties to polarize and to take a definite 
stance since slavery subsumed the function of the “great principle” from the first 
party system, i.e., the generation of political incentives that demand partisan 
responses. Nevertheless, political parties did not follow this rational scenario. They
1 Silbey, Joel H. 2002. “From ‘Essential to the Existence of Our Institutions* to ‘Rapacious Enemies of  
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persisted in maintaining the intersectional alliance, thereby casting aside the 
pragmatic solution to the problem arisen. Such passive reaction on the part of 
political parties created political disequilibrium, with one ideological side of the 
dominant issue left vacant, which paved the way for the creation of the Republican 
Party. By the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the Democratic Party shifted closer to 
the pro-slavery side while the Whig Party remained deeply divided over this issue 
along regional lines and kept on occupying the median position, which basically 
sealed its fate. Aldrich comes with yet another explanation of the decline of the 
Whig Party-theory of ambitious politicians.1 With the devastating loss in the 1853 
elections, some northern politicians started to desert the Whig Party because they 
did not believe in its future ability to saturate their political ambitions. Rather, they 
switched to the Republican Party, which they perceived as a more viable 
mechanism to achieve office. As a consequence, the decline of the Whig Party 
was invigorated by yet another political value totally unassociated with the 
ideological nature of slavery -  pragmatic careerism of aspiring politicians.
It might seem that the excesses of the late ante-bellum era with its intrinsic 
unprecedented upheaval of partisan loyalties inevitably should herald an end to 
the deep-rooted mythos of political parties, and their unchallenged reign over the 
political processes should begin to crumble. However, such a scenario proved 
unfounded and a little bit premature. The substitution of the Whig Party for the 
Republican Party was purely of a mechanical character, without serious structural 
consequences for the whole party system. To use a metaphor, one inconvenient 
political gladiator was forced to depart unwillingly from the arena of political battles 
and a more popular one entered, even though the essence of the arena and style 
of fight remained the same as such. As Silbey puts it: “when the smoke cleared 
after series of intense voter shifts, after the death of one party and the rise of 
another, the essential structure of American politics remained largely as before.”2 
The decline of the Whig Party, per se, symbolized merely retribution for its 
impotence of pragmatic action and dubious perseverence on conservation of 
status quo in spite of existence of heavy stimuli for partisan polarization. As a
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
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result, political parties learned an important lesson - non-responsiveness to salient 
issues entailed degradation of the established mythos and eventuated serious 
disintegration of party identification. The long-term endurance of bipartisan 
hegemony of the Democratic and Republican parties well illustrates their 
enlightenment from past party development and their ability to absorb in a sponge­
like manner emerging matters of political concern, thereby greatly confining space 
for permanent success of the third parties.
Out of the components of the Key-Sorauf triad, only the party-in-the- 
electorate underwent turmoil; the party system experienced unparalleled shift in 
voters’ commitments and, subsequently, due to the after-effects of the Civil War 
and sectionalism, “ostracization” of the Republican Party in the South became an 
important feature of the then political climate. As far as the party-as-organization is 
concerned, the political parties formally remained the same with only petty 
changes in their structural mechanisms and overall image. Primarily, the 
Democrats and Republicans concentrated their effort upon enforcing party 
loyalties and linking their voters with significance of new issues and conflicts. 
Although the United States experienced a turbulent change from an agricultural 
society into a highly industrialized one in this era, the political parties seemed to 
remain virtually untouched by this phenomenon. The Republican and Democratic 
parties still continued to “confront each other in the well disciplined, predictable 
phalanxes of people deeply committed to powerful, closely competitive institutions 
designed to fulfill group and individual needs.”1
With respect to the party-in-government, it exhibited substantial strength with 
average party unity in the Congress reaching its all-time peak in this epoch. This 
was caused by an unparalleled hierarchization of legislative power in the 1880s. 
Centralization incentives came predominantly from one strong politician, 
Republican Speaker “Boss” Thomas Reed, who effectively monopolized and 
usurped control over proceedings in the House of Representatives by 
implementing partially autocratic and coercive structural mechanisms. For 
example, he managed to “appoint all chairs and all members of committees for 
both parties, virtually control the flow of legislation through committees and
1 Silbey, Joel H. 2002. “From ‘Essential to the Existence of Our Institutions“ to ‘Rapacious Enemies of 
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maintained equally great control over the agenda on the floor itself.”1 As a 
consequence, the majority party found it much easier to hammer out its proposed 
policies, and the power of the minority party to block legislation was greatly 
impaired. Reed’s centralizing practices were later taken up by “Czar” Joseph 
Cannon, who further reinforced the position of Speaker by granting access to the 
most important committees only to those politicians who exhibited deep loyalties to 
his cause, thus ruthlessly ostracizing the enemies within his party.
Paradoxically enough, whereas the whole country experienced its Gilded Age 
after the Civil War, American political parties enjoyed their Golden Age as their cult 
reached its zenith in this period, which can be illustrated by the enormously high 
voter turn-out in presidential elections (ranging between 70 to 80 percent, 
including the highest voter turnout in the history of the United States in 1876 -
81.8 %). So as to enhance their manipulative skills, political parties developed new 
forms for concentration of political power such as urban political machines and 
patronage-based party organizations that played a vital role in mobilization of 
voters on the election day, often even utilizing foul means. Indeed, the 1880s and 
1890s witnessed a massive growth of fraudulent activities, including bribing and 
intimidating voters or falsifying and miscounting of votes.2 It is obvious that often 
illiterate and uneducated electorate could hardly resist the omnipresent mythos of 
nearly omnipotent political parties. Yet, their duopoly over political processes 
should soon encounter its first disruptions.
2.4 Era of Party Democratization
The fourth party system triggered an inconspicuous and gradual trend that 
utterly changed the function, role and structure of political parties -  they started to 
lose their hitherto impeccable and sacred glamor. This process ironically was 
brought forth by the over-accumulation or consolidation of power within their 
hands. As a result, the political parties of the Gilded Age succumbed excessively 
to delusion of their own omnipotence, utterly lost sense of self-reflection, and even 
put into practice massive electoral fraud that otherwise pertains only to
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
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authoritarian regimes, which could not be left without response. In other words, the 
political parties of the Gilded Age had moved too far from the classical conception 
of democracy and fair contest over popular votes -  their professional 
organizations, including party bosses, wielded unprecedented influence and 
started to misuse it drastically. Naturally, every self-complacency has its limits, so 
even the political parties experienced their Icarian fall. They too lost any contact 
with reality and strove to approach the sun without realizing the possibility of being 
scorched.
Already the 1880s witnessed the rise of alternative political forces in the form 
of third parties (especially the Greenbacks), which openly criticized arrogant 
political behavior of major political parties and initiated the introduction of the so- 
called Australian ballot (i.e. provisions for secret voting instead of party tickets), 
which can be viewed as the first omen of the future weakening of party 
organizations. Suddenly, more and more people started to show their deep 
dissatisfaction because “party control had led to rampant corruption and 
government inefficiency.”1
The negativism related to major political parties in the 1880s and 1890s 
became translated into Progressive reforms at the onset of the 20th century, 
reforms which aimed principally, according to Richard Jensen, at banishing “all 
forms of traditionalism -  boss control, corrupt practices, big business interventions 
in politics, ‘ignorant’ voting and excessive hands of hack politicians.”2 The 
Progressives could no longer tolerate the degenerate and iniquitous status quo of 
the then political culture, and they wanted above all to cure its intrinsic ills, thus 
breaking the artificial duopoly of major political parties over political processes. 
Indeed, never since the Progressive reforms have the political parties regained 
such a strong position as they had enjoyed in the Gilded Age. Essentially, the 
Progressive reforms helped to approximate two, theretofore relatively 
independent, components of the Key-Sorauf triad (the party-as-organization and 
party-in-the-electorate) by integrating the ordinary citizen into the partisan 
machinery. These reforms included introduction of direct senatorial primaries and
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presidential primaries in the states, reformation of national conventions, or 
enactment of laws defining and limiting party organizations. They had two 
immediate consequences, which irrevocably changed the architecture of the party- 
as-organization -  first, they substantially limited the party’s privilege to select 
candidates and, second, definition of policy issues stopped being an exquisite 
matter of partisan arbitrariness.1 Ultimately, Progressivism helped to implement 
the “democratic ethos” into partisan organizations as they have become “more 
public, more decentralized, and more active at the grassroots.”2
A fresh breeze of the Progressive idealism also left a considerable imprint on 
the face of the party-in-government as the common creed of the 19th century 
politics regarding subordination of politicians to the cause of the party experienced 
its first heavy blow in the 1910s. The power over control of procedures and 
personal constitution of the individual committees was wrested away from party 
bosses and given to senior members of the Congress, a phenomenon, which 
substantially undermined partisan influence over legislative agenda and inherently 
disrupted the hegemonic and “sacred” position of the Speaker from Cannon’s era. 
Consequently, parties “lost control over committee assignments and the Rules 
Committee, and their ability to reward or punish individual members also 
declined.”3 One can easily deduce that such a type of reforms enabled creation of 
new autonomous structures with a relative high degree of independence within the 
party, entailing substantial decentralization of the party-in-government.4
The Progressive Era brought yet another dimension to the Key-Sorauf triad 
that seemingly has only little connection to it. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
the federal government consolidated its position in a historically unparalleled 
manner as the idea of laissez-faire economy had worn itself out and the traditional 
role of a passive and non-interfering state had become an anachronism. The 
expanding power of government overtook some hitherto exclusive competences of 
political parties (e.g. the domain of social welfare), which implied drastic limitation
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of partisan appeals and consequently entailed the collapse of the patronage 
system. As Silbey puts it, “the Progressives successfully promoted the growth of 
government power and a shift in focus from generalized, distributive policies to 
new regulative channels, which demanded technical budgeting, and an ability to 
deal with sophisticated control mechanisms -  rather than more generalist 
negotiating talents of party leaders.”1 In other words, Progressivism became an 
incubator of technocratic and bureaucratic apparatuses and impersonal decision­
making where party loyalties enjoyed only little relevance. Political parties simply 
lost their monopoly over execution of certain policies and, as a result, other 
channels arose how to shape governmental products in the form of non-partisan 
pressure groups. Daniel T. Rodgers calls this phenomenon “the explosion of 
scores of aggressive, politically active pressure groups into the space left space 
left by recession of traditionally political loyalties,” which naturally becomes 
transposed into further attack on the party-as-organization.2
However, as I have already noted, the process of party transformation was 
distinguished by substantial sluggishness and territorial discrepancies. Whereas 
some regions quickly adapted to the political requirements and patterns of the new 
era, others looked backwards and steadfastly clung to the out-dated world of 
urban political machines and deep-rooted political loyalties. This schizophrenia of 
American politics of the fourth party system was further invigorated by the New 
Deal Era, when political parties, in a way, regressed to their 19th century status as 
a huge wave of recurring inveterate partisan loyalties appeared. To sum up, the 
1890s to the 1960s were above all a transition period between two utterly distinct 
political worlds, between a mass-based party characterized by rigid electorate and 
straight-ticket voting and a “democratized” contemporary party marked by flexible 
electorate and split-ticket voting.
2.5 Conclusion
Above all, the 19th century was the era of a great turbulence in the 
development of American political parties. Political parties appeared, enjoyed their
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moment of glory and than disappeared phantomlike, and it was not until the 1860s 
when the party system finally became stabilized. At first, political parties presented 
rather an anathema to the nation, but the antipathy and suspicion gradually 
attenuated and, subsequently, political parties even paradoxically became an icon 
of blind veneration on the part of voters. David simply became a Goliath, a 
timorous orphan of the first party system became perhaps too confident and self- 
centered giant of the third party system. However, most importantly, an aristocratic 
abstraction encompassing only one segment of the Key-Sorauf triad became a 
highly organized democratic mechanism with a wide appeal to masses, hence 
synthetizing all three components, i.e., party-in-government, party-as-organization, 
and party-in-the-electorate.
Nevertheless, if one should be more precise, the “democratic“ expansion into 
the electorate was rather of a “pseudodemocratic“ or “bastard aristocratic“ 
character, as the 19th century and also the first half of the 20th century functioned 
rather as a medieval age of partisanship, with voters being rather meek and 
obedient followers of party commands and dogmas. The relative scarcity of 
informational sources enabled political parties to “enchant“ and manipulate voters, 
very much resembling a cult. As a result, political parties were largely non- 
responsive to the electorate, hence still latently preserving their elitist character 
from the first party system. This basically shapes a unifying feature for the second, 
third, fourth, and, as we will see, also for the fifth party system, although 
Progressivism managed to partially erode their dominance. It was ironically the 
Goliath-like dimension of political parties that eventuated their relative fall in the 
fourth party system. The unprecedented over-accumulation of political power 
within the hands of political parties created a false idea of invincibility in them, 
which is incompatible with any democratic system and no wonder that it incited a 
small revolution within certain liberal circles of the American society in the form of 
Progressivism. As a result, political parties learned their lesson at the beginning of 




The New Deal realignment not only changed the gravity of political power in 
favor of the Democratic Party but, more importantly, it inconspicuously sowed the 
seeds of later partisan upheaval of the 1960s. The Democratic Party once and for 
all stepped out of its southern shadow and massively expanded to Northern urban 
areas, which entailed unexampled heterogenization and diversification of its 
individual constituencies. As a result, little by little, the Democrats started to shed 
their purely rural and agriculture orientation and increasingly began to attract 
metropolitan voters from industrial regions.1 Naturally, such a multitude of 
contradictory interests implied considerable tensions and divisions within the 
partisan structures as one can hardly assume that a southern politician from rural 
areas would share the same system of beliefs and preferences as a northern 
politician from urban areas. Such irreconcilable differences included antithetical 
views on welfare programs, governmental role in economy but, ultimately, on the 
question of civil rights. As V.O.Key, Jr. put it in his classical work Southern Politics 
in State and Nation: “In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around 
the position of the Negro.”2 This salient issue inflicted much controversy upon the 
Democratic Party as, on the one hand, the southern Democrats still intrinsically 
clung to the doctrine of subjugation of blacks but, on the other hand, there existed 
an important share of African-American Democratic electorate in the north, which 
purposefully pushed extension of civil rights on party’s agenda. As a result, in the 
1940s, the Congress experienced the rise of a steady autonomous voting block 
within the Democratic Party -  “an island, entire of itself” -  in the form of the 
southern Democrats.
With a certain hyperbole, the period between the 1940s and 1980s can be 
termed a “tripartisan era” as the party-unity index and index of cohesion of the 
Democratic Party in the Congress reached its historical nadir and the southern 
Democrats very frequently revolted against their parent party and often formed the 
so-called conservative coalition with the Republican Party in order to block any 
liberal initiatives on the part of the northern wing of the Democratic Party. The
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ideological split became so prominent that Lubell even aptly labels this 
phenomenon as “a civil war inside the Democratic Party.”1 Therefore, this chapter 
will explore how the revolt against the Speaker from the 1910s facilitated the rise 
of the southern Democrats, how the conservative coalition influenced and shaped 
the functioning of the party-in-government, and what institutional mechanisms 
were developed by the Democratic Party in order to restore its unity in the 1970s.
3.1 Scholarly Reflections
As we have already learned, the post-Progressive Era Congress 
distinguished itself by a substantial diffusion of power, which resulted from 
dismantling the hierarchical structure from the Speaker Reed and Cannon eras. 
Majorities on the House of Representatives floor were no longer formed by the 
principle of subordination of the political actors to the cause of the whole party but 
rather one utilized concession-making mechanisms, which might, at least from 
certain perspectives, remotely symbolize regression to factionalism of the pre­
party era. As a consequence, the impotence of political parties to automatically win 
majorities led many political scientists to the assumption that the political parties 
had declined. At the beginning of the 1950s, a group of prominent political 
scientists (e.g. E. E. Schattschneider, V.O.Key, Jr. et al.) published the 1950 
Report of the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political 
Parties entitled Towards a More Responsible Party System which stated that 
“either major party, when in power, is ill-equipped to organize its members in the 
legislative and executive branches into a government held together and guided by 
the party program.”2 The Report also defined two basic prerequisites that should 
be met to achieve responsible party government: “An effective system requires, 
first, that the parties are able to bring fourth programs to which they commit 
themselves, and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to 
carry out these programs.”3
The gloomy prospect about the future of American political parties even 
intensified in the 1960s and led a journalist David S. Broder to write a book called
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The Party’s Over, where he inter alia expressed his fears of “further fracturing of 
the already enfeebled party structure” in the near future.1 Luckily, as it later 
became apparent, his worries did not materialize, and the period between the 
1920s and 1970s functioned only as a mere vacuum era of search for alternatives 
to the rigidly hierarchical 19th century party-in-government under the new changing 
political conditions. In short, political parties, especially the Democratic Party, were 
simply not institutionally prepared for massive democratization resulting from the 
Progressive Era reforms.
3.2 Incentives for Reforms
The frustration of the inability to reach a coherent voting block culminated 
during the era of House Speaker Sam Rayburn where “leadership usually had no 
choice but to engage in the painful process of assembling shifting majorities 
behind particular bills through bargaining and maneuver.”2 Above all, Rayburn 
strove to curtail conflict, preferring peaceful and permissive compromise of the 
proposed legislative agenda, which naturally became reflected in disparagement 
of the function of the party leaders and disproportionately high accumulation of 
political power within the hand of the individual committees. In other words, 
“Rayburn was far more inclined to accept the defeat of party programs than to risk 
his influence and prestige in battles to attain them.”3 Naturally, the diffusion of 
power created more than a positive environment for creation of alternative political 
groupings which could easily challenge and block mainstream policy initiatives. If 
we add growing partisan cleavages and contradictory political preferences within 
the Democratic Party, then one can perceive the occurrence of a conservative 
coalition as inevitable. Between the beginning of the 1950s and the reform era of 
the mid-1960s, the conservative coalition formed on about one vote in four and the 
index of cohesion dropped under 60 percent for both parties.4 Aldrich terms the 
situation as a “divided majority party,” the scenario when “northern Democrats are
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fairly homogeneous, and distinct from relatively homogeneous southern 
Democrats, who are in turn distinct from relatively homogeneous Republicans.”1 
Consequently, the Democratic Party faced two immense challenges -  how to 
assure homogenization of partisan preferences and how to structurally create a 
favorable environment for consequential policies based upon stable majorities.
Rohde identifies the beginning of reform attempts within the Congress as 
1959 when the Democratic Study Group (DSG) was established.2 The primary 
goal of this organization, composed mainly of liberal northern Democrats, was to 
conceive institutional mechanisms for restoring Democratic unity within the party- 
in-government. One of the leading protagonists of the DSG, Richard Bolling, in his 
book House out of Order, suggested basic remedies for curing the ills of House 
Democrats and attenuation of the influence of conservatives, who, according to 
him, “subverted the objectives and defied the spirit of the Democratic Party as a 
whole.”3 He called for restriction of the seniority system with subsequent more 
representative allocation of committee seats, enhancement of the role of the 
Speaker under supervision of the caucus, and reinforcement of members’ 
commitments to party leadership.4 That is, he wanted to merge the centralized and 
hierarchical model from the Cannon era with simultaneously increased 
accountability and responsibility of the individual politicians.
3.3 Reform Era
The stimulus that finally impelled the Democratic Party to act was the second 
half of the 1960s when Democrats received fairly high electoral support but their 
power to win majorities was further debilitated because southern committee 
leaders utilized the power vested in them by the seniority system to block the 
proposed agenda. The reforms primarily rested on institutional proposals by the 
DSG and bore much resemblance to theoretical conclusions of Richard Bolling. 
Rohde distinguishes basically three tracks of reform: curtailment of powers of
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Political Parties in America. 
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committee chairmen, strengthening of the Democratic Party and its leadership, 
and establishment of collective control of power.1
The first group of reforms aimed at further fragmentation and redistribution of 
political power from committees to subcommittees, a phenomenon which may 
seem rather irrational at first glance but it very inconspicuously inflicted an 
immensely powerful blow to senior southern Democratic committee chairmen. 
First, significant reforms were executed in 1971 when the Democratic Caucus 
adopted recommendations made by its Hansen Committee. Among other things, 
they limited the power of the caucus when voting for committee chairs, and 
subcommittees became more independent of committees as for financial and staff 
resources.2 The major innovation came in 1973 with the so-called “subcommittee 
bill of rights,” which further stripped committee chairs of many privileges. 
Subcommittee chairmen were no longer appointed by committees, rather they 
were selected on the principle of seniority. Each subcommittee gained a specific 
jurisdiction and all legislation referred to a particular committee automatically 
became subject to review of the appropriate subcommittee. Moreover, each 
subcommittee was provided with own budget, and the subcommittee chairman 
acquired the privilege of choosing his staff.3 Also, in 1973, it became a rule to vote 
for committee chairmen in the caucus with a secret ballot if so requested.
The second group of reforms centered on centralization and enhancement of 
political party strength in the policy-making processes. The first inchoative step in 
this area involved institutionalization of The Steering and Policy Committee under 
chairmanship of the Speaker in 1973, its main task being to deliver policy 
initiatives to the Caucus for appraisal.4 Further reforms substantially reinforced the 
role of the Speaker - in 1975, the Speaker was vested with the important 
institutional privilege to appoint the chair of the Rules Committee and all its 
members with approval of the caucus. This again impaired conservative power to 
block the party agenda, and in 1977, the Speaker, at the House of 
Representatives, was empowered with the right to set time limits on committees
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when considering the bills.1 Finally, firm ratios of Democrats to Republicans were 
established on committees and all subcommittees.
The third category of reforms dealt with greater accountability of party elites 
to rank-and-filer members of Congress and reinforcement of political party as a 
collectivity. Some structural provisions in this area were incorporated into the 
foregoing subcommittee bill of rights, which inter alia introduced the requirement of 
a Democratic caucus for each subcommittee. Special attention was paid to the 
four most important committees -  Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and 
Means. For example, new privileges were bestowed upon the Caucus; it began to 
vote on the ratification of Appropriations subcommittee chairmen, to elect 
chairmen of the Budget Committee, to ratify all Democratic nominations to the 
Rules Committee etc.2 Also, the Ways and Means Committee lost its privilege of 
making committee assignments and it was augmented by 50 percent so as to 
more represent the demographic composition of the Caucus. The ultimate goal of 
this reform surge was self-evident; it was the creation of a favorable institutional 
environment for intra-party homogenization of partisan preferences and an 
attenuation of the political power of elements incompatible with party’s 
predominant policy positions. On the surface, these reforms may seem 
contradictory under certain perspectives but they effectively put an end to the 
political disequilibrium connected with excessive unipolarization of political power 
as it was transferred from committees to both superior and inferior hierarchical 
structures. Consequently, the era of revolt against the Speaker smoothly passed 
into the epoch of revolt against the committee chairs, which greatly undermined 
the power of the southern conservatives and helped to better reflect the positions 
of the party majority.
According to Rohde, these reforms institutionally prepared the ground for the 
creation of a consensual environment, which is a fundamental prerequisite for 
responsible political party to be operative; “there would be party responsibility only 
if there were widespread policy agreement among House Democrats.“3 This
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postulation forms the very basis of his concept of the conditional party 
government, which is defined as follows:
The obligation to support party positions, moreover was not intended to apply equally to all 
members. There was no intention to create a system of party responsibility like those that operate 
in parliamentary democracies, imposing on every member the requirement to support every party 
position. Instead obligation was to be imposed on members “who held positions of power“ -  party 
leaders, committee chairmen, members of prestige committees. In effect, seeking and accepting 
positions of influence within the committee or party leadership meant accepting an implied contract: 
such leaders were obliged to support -  or at least not block -  policy initiatives on which there was a 
party consensus. If these were violated, members risked the loss of their influential positions. Party 
support was also expected from representatives who aspired to these positions. Taken together, 
these elements define the system that we have termed conditional party government. Committee 
and party leaders were to be responsible to the members, not vice versa. Members were to be free 
to pursue their own goals within a generally decentralized system.1
Above all, the conditional party government generates considerable 
incentives for aspiring politicians on a quid pro quo basis. If one wants to occupy a 
prestigious position within the party hierarchy in the House of Representatives, 
one must accept responsibility for successful promotion of the party agenda within 
his or her operational range. In other words, the party distributes political rewards 
in exchange for loyal behavior and support of party positions. In the scope of the 
conditional party government, Barbara Sinclair discerns three major impacts of the 
reforms on the structure of the party-in-government: first, negative sanctions from 
the Cannon era are substituted with positive inducements when leaders and rank- 
file-members become partners and the rigid superiority/inferiority system is 
broken. Second, the leadership can utilize much more efficient and systematic 
tools to structure the choice situation of the rank-and-file members than in the 
Rayburn era. Third, and perhaps most importantly, a historically unparalleled 
number of politicians is included into the very process of coalition-building, a 
process further reinforced by extensive implementation of task forces and ad hoc 
groups in the 1980s, thus enabling junior members to participate in preparation of 
specific legislation.2 As a consequence, the controlled unipolarization of political
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power from the pre-Progressive Era and its subsequent uncontrolled 
multipolarization was replaced by its controlled multipolarization which inheres 
upon extensive integration of party members in policy matters.
One would expect that the implementation of reforms focused on 
reinforcement of the party-in-government became projected to increase party 
cohesion. However, the contrary was reality as the process of assimilation of 
partisan preferences exhibited sluggishness. In the 1967-1982 era, the number of 
party votes (proportion of votes when a majority of Democrats opposes a majority 
of Republicans) averaged 36 percent compared with 49 percent in the 1955-1966 
period.1 The turning point as far as party governance is concerned came in 1982 
when party voting and party unity scores began their gradual but steady rise, and 
the impact of reforms finally manifested itself in extenso. The explanation of this 
phenomenon is simple. The reforms were tailored to the scenario of homogenous 
partisan preferences, thus the most important if of Rohde’s conditional party 
government was not yet satisfied at the end of the 1970s due to still prevalent 
heterogeneity of the Democratic constituencies.
The underlying factor that eventuated the homogenization of partisan 
constituencies was adoption of the Voting Rights Act, which led to massive 
enfranchisement of the blacks in the South. Hence the Act irrevocably pushed the 
Democratic Party to the liberal side of the political spectrum and the Republican 
Party to its conservative side. The issue of civil rights drastically changed the 
electoral map of American politics, and it eventuated partisan realignment in the 
South and Northeast as these historical bastions of the Democratic and 
Republican Party suddenly started to favor the rival party. Conservative southern 
Democrats and liberal northeastern Republicans were simply no longer able “to 
hang on in their historic constituencies” and, as a result, “the centrist elements in 
both parties shrank in numbers.”2 For example, the southern Democratic 
membership in the House of Representatives was 40 percent during the 1953- 
1958 period, then it sank to 33 percent between 1959 and 1964, further to 30 
percent in the period from 1965 to 1974, and to 25 percent during the 1975-1982
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period.1 Naturally, this phenomenon projected itself in the homogenization of 
partisan preferences and, as Fenno puts it, “the two parties became less conflicted 
internally, but more partisan externally.”2
Aldrich basically distinguishes three main aspects that further solidified the 
unity of the Democratic Party and enhanced partisanship at the beginning of the 
1980s -  Reagan’s aggressive conservative fiscal policy, including tax cuts, the 
loss of the Senate majority and the formation of very low House majority.3 
Consequently, the Democrats were left with only little maneuvering space and they 
could not afford to act as a non-cohesive group if they wanted to pass their 
agenda. As a result, the proportion of party votes rose to over 50 percent after the 
1982 elections and it averaged 58 percent in the 1990s.4
The newly created unity in the Democratic Party reflected itself in the 
increased frustration in the Republican Party with the impotence to push forward 
its own agenda. To counter Democratic legislative success, the Republicans 
copied several structural mechanisms used by the Democratic Party during the 
reform era such as the strengthening of party leadership and the weakening of the 
influence of the committee chairmen. The Republican conference, a counterpart of 
the Democratic Caucus, was given power to ratify the nominations of the 
committee chairmen and the Republican leader was enabled to nominate the 
chairman of the Rules Committee and was vested with greater powers with 
committee assignments.5 Hence we can say that “the party had become more 
central to the policy process in the House by the late 1980s” and the Democrats 
and Republicans started to resemble two distinct phalanxes prepared to battle it 
out on every presented issue.6
Unlike the House of Representatives, the development of the party-in- 
government in the Senate is a totally different story. Whereas the House needs
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only a simple majority to change its procedural rules, the Senate needs a two 
thirds majority, which aggravates any institutional initiatives, with only few 
structural modifications having been implemented in the 1970s, such as change of 
the cloture rule or enhancement of responsibility of committee chairs to the rank- 
and-file Senators by instituting the requirement of membership approval votes.1 
The unwillingness of Senators to renounce their own prerogatives follows from the 
very quintessence of the Senate when Senators, per se, wield much more power 
than their House counterparts since they can amend large pieces of legislation 
nearly ad libitum. Within the framework of the modern candidate-centered age, this 
privilege predetermines them to be an appealing object for the media spotlight 
and, more importantly, for interest groups as they can prove to be influential in a 
number of political issues, which makes them considerably independent of their 
parent party and supports entrepreneurial style of their senatorial experience. The 
individualism of Senators and their autonomy are even magnified by their longer 
terms and larger constituencies as opposed to Representatives. Consequently, the 
Senate has ignored the second track of reforms according to Rohde’s 
categorization, i.e. strengthening of party leadership, and the Senate majority 
leader is denied control over the flow of legislation in contrast to the Speaker of the 
House. Yet, in spite of its loose hierarchy, the Senate has become more partisan 
in recent years as party votes amounted to 43 percent in the 1955 - 1990 period 
and the proportion rose to 57 percent between 1990 and 2000, a phenomenon 
which can be attributed not only to the increased role of political activists in 
American politics but also to extensive number of services and resources 
bestowed upon Senators by political parties.2 As a consequence, we can say that 
the present dynamic political environment has facilitated a transformation of the 
Senate “from an inward-looking, committee- and seniority-dominated institution, in 
which influence and resources were quite unequally distributed, to an individualist, 
outward-looking institution with a much more equal distribution of resources.”3
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3.4 Conclusion
Above all, the partisan turmoil from the 1960s and the reforms from the 1970s 
enabled to harmonize personal and operative preferences of political actors within 
the party-in-government and move them closer to the median position of the 
parent party (herewith I mean desired political orientation of the party). Rohde 
defines the personal preferences as “the legislator’s own views on the alternatives 
available for choice - what he or she would choose if no other influences were 
present” and the operative preferences as “the preferences that actually govern 
the voting choice, when all the other forces pressuring the member are taken into 
account.”1 To put it differently, where personal preferences symbolize the inner will 
of the political actor devoid of disruptive outer elements, i.e., an internalized 
coherent set of stances he or she is likely to support under ideal circumstances, 
operative preferences can change under impact of external factors and represent 
real voting-decisions for the political actor. The outside forces that exercise 
influence on operative preferences include political activists, party leaders, and 
constituencies. During the Cannon Era, operative preferences in most cases 
coincided with the median position of the party, but frequently contradicted the 
personal preferences of the particular political actors due to the autocratic and 
coercive nature of the party-in-government, thus creating consensus within the 
party only by artificial means. The post-Progressive Era witnessed the 
harmonization of personal and operative preferences but, simultaneously, it 
witnessed frequent deviation from the desired median position of the party. The 
conservative coalition presents a nice example of this phenomenon since the 
power of many heterogeneous partisan constituencies became superior to party 
leadership, eventuating a lack of consensus in political parties, especially within 
the Democratic Party. However, as the constituencies of the individual parties 
gradually became homogenized as a result of partisan crystallization within the 
framework of liberal/conservative scale, symbiosis of party and constituency 
interests occurred. Parties have become more transparent for office-seekers and, 
as a result, a liberally-oriented politician is more likely to enter the Democratic 
Party and a conservative-oriented politician is more likely to join the Republican
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Party. The relative uniformity of personal preferences of the political actors reflects 
itself in establishment of natural consensus within political parties, a prerequisite 
for responsible party government. The present party-in-government makes 
personal preferences and operative preferences only rarely antithetical and keeps 
them in relative propinquity to the median party position.
So, how does the contemporary parties fare more than 50 years after 
publication of the Report on responsible party government? Are they able to bring 
fourth programs to which they commit themselves? Beyond doubt, they now 
convey a much clearer message to the electorate than they did in the 1950s. They 
no longer overlap in the middle of the political spectrum since they are rather 
extensively polarized, which increases probability of their commitment to their 
promoted ideologies. And do they possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out 
these programs? Even here, one has to conclude that they exhibit a substantial 
inner cohesion, which follows from data on voting in the Congress. There may 
exist certain ideological streams within the parties, but they are located within the 
basic consensual range of each political party. Hence, with respect to party-in- 
government, American political parties, after the eras of artificial consensus and 
missing consensus, have finally reached the era of naturally-created consensus, 
and they have substantially increased their responsibility.
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4 Party-as-Organization
Of the three components of the Key-Sorauf triad, the one that underwent 
most turbulent changes in the 1960s is the party-as-organization. The vehemence 
and massiveness of the outer political incentives that appeared in this epoch 
forced the political parties to submit its deep-rooted structural mechanisms to an 
in-depth scrutiny and subsequent reassessment, which entailed unprecedented 
changes in the form, content and principles of the party-as-organization, 
considered by some as an omen of future possible collapse of the political parties 
(e.g. Broder in Party’s Over. The Failure of Politics in America, 1973). Initially, this 
chapter focuses on the inherent flaws of traditional party organizations established 
in Van Buren’s era, after which it focuses on the factors that triggered the 
unprecedented proliferation of structural reforms in the 1970s. In addition, it 
analyzes similarities and differences between the reforms implemented on the part 
of the two major parties and their immediate consequences. The whole chapter is 
concluded by a comparative analysis of aspects that distinguish the new 
candidate-centered era from the traditional party-as-organization, while also 
assessing present party strength.
4.1 Traditional Party Organization
Green and Herrnson basically classify three major weaknesses inherent in 
the traditional party-as-organization that was established in 1832. Firstly, the 
national conventions and national committees predominantly had an ad hoc 
character and served only as “temporary coordinating devices for presidential 
nominations and campaigns,” with an otherwise negligible political impact. 
Secondly, they were “largely unrepresentative, often nonparticipatory and 
notoriously nonprogrammatic.” Thirdly, party platforms “were largely campaign 
documents that stated general party principles, but they were rarely useful 
guidelines for policymaking.”1 Traditionally, the party-as-organization was based 
upon subjugation of the national party to the needs of local and state
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organizations, as the former were to a great extent dependent on financial 
assistance of the latter. The national party resembled rather a chaotic mosaic of 
state interests, with little coordination and extensive fragmentation, where each 
segment enjoyed perhaps excessive freedom. In his classical work Politics, 
Parties, and Pressure Groups, V.O. Key, Jr. even noted that “no nationwide 
organization exists...Rather, each party consists of a working coalition of state and 
local parties.”1 As though magically, state organizations remained virtually 
untouched by the flow of time and succeeded in artificial conserving of the 
confederative character of the entire partisan system for more than one hundred 
years. Accordingly, the local and state organizations held uncontested monopoly 
over the nomination processes, which reflected itself in their inherent elitist nature, 
with vital decisions being frequently made in smoke filled-rooms by a closed circle 
of party regulars.
The mechanism, which Marshall terms as the brokered convention system, 
survived even the menace of the Progressive surge during the 1910s when 
reformers tried to enfeeble the power of party bosses by heavy implementation of 
the system of direct presidential primary elections.2 However, the party regulars 
managed to curb and even diminish the popularization of presidential primary 
elections by arguing that primaries undermined party unity, enhanced factionalism 
and were characterized by low-voter participation and high cost of campaigning. 
As a result, in 1935, only 14 presidential primary elections were held by the 
Democratic Party and 12 by the Republican Party compared to 20 by both parties 
in 1916.3 Hence the monopoly of party leadership over the selection of presidential 
candidates remained nearly unaffected by Progressivism and the system of 
conventions and caucuses continued to prevail. A presidential candidate still did 
not need to seek support from grassroots party members, and he was likely to 
succeed by “assembling a core of committed supporters, then winning over other 
sympathetic or like-minded party leaders and uncommitted politicos” and wait for 
the “bandwagon effect” to do its job among the delegates during the convention.4 
As a result, the presidential nomination process preserved its elitist and
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aristocratic nature with rank-and-file party members playing only infinitesimal role 
in it.
Naturally, such artificial perseverence of estrangement from the masses 
generated much antagonism and agitation within the electorate and, as a result, 
cries for more responsible parties became a common American reality 
phenomenon. What simmered throughout the nation for a long time revealed itself 
in its full nakedness in the 1960s. The social turmoils of this era irrevocably 
changed the ingrained mechanisms within the party-as-organization and produced 
the rise of a brand new system in presidential nominations -  the system of popular 
appeal.1 In a sense, the tumultuous 1960s finished what the Progressive Era had 
started, i.e. radical reassessment of the relationship between the grassroots party 
membership and party leadership. It also opened presidential selection procedures 
to the general public.
The first portent of the future attack on rigid party mechanisms was the rise of 
liberal amateur activists within the Democratic Party in the 1950s, activists who 
started to impugn the ostensibly ossified features inherent in the party-as- 
organization, such as patronage, balanced tickets, and party loyalty.2 According to 
them, the ideological orientation of a candidate had to be unconditionally superior 
to partisan devotion or social and regional background. Democratic activists 
gained considerable support in northern metropolitan areas, and they seriously 
undermined the position of the local party regulars. However, the first systematic 
intervention in the selection of presidential candidates on the part of party activists 
first appeared in the Republican Party when they organized state by state to 
support conservative Arizona U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater in defiance to more 
moderate elements within the GOP.3 Although he suffered a devastating defeat in 
the subsequent presidential elections, his example demonstrated that there might 
be an electoral alternative to the strictly partisan one.
4.2 Antecedents of Democratic Path of Reform
The incentive that definitely buried the concept of the brokered election 
system came in 1968 when the Democratic Party was stricken by a serious inner




crisis resulting from quarrels over the presidential candidate. Due to the dubious 
results of the Vietnam conflict, two distinct antithetical phalanxes arose within the 
ranks of the Democratic Party - one group, formed by the party elite, preferred 
continuity in U.S. foreign policy and supported President Lyndon B. Jonhson’s 
candidacy while the other, united by deep anti-war sentiments, centered U.S. 
Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN). The announcement of presidential candidacy 
by McCarthy generated a large stir on the part of the anti-war political activists, 
including an unprecedented number of students, and he soon became a serious 
rival to Lyndon Johnson despite the rather quixotic beginnings of his campaign.1 
Although Johnson eventually triumphed in the New Hampshire primary by 
securing 49.6 percent of the vote compared to McCarthy’s 41.9, his victory was 
rather Pyrrhic for several reasons. First, New Hampshire was a relatively 
conservative state, and second, more importantly, McCarthy received nearly no 
support from party regulars, had very limited partisan resources and was only 
assisted by a number of political volunteers.2 Rather than risking a bitter defeat, 
Johnson decided to step out of the race in favor of his Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey. The field of contenders was further enlarged by a U.S. Senator Robert 
Kennedy (D-NY), whose personality had far greater potential to form electoral 
coalitions than McCarthy, who attracted a much more heterogeneous group of 
voters, such as blacks, antimilitarists, the poor and young.3 Humphrey relied on 
the support of party elites and his strategy seemed to work well as vast majority of 
states (namely 35) still chose convention delegates by means of caucuses and 
conventions, by appointment or by commissions.4
The final showdown between the two irreconcilable camps within the 
Democratic Party took place in the August 1968 Democratic National Convention 
in Chicago with an uneasy and strained atmosphere magnified by the 
assassination of Kennedy. Thousands of demonstrators gathered around in 
Chicago to vent their frustrations over the Vietnam policies and to protest the non- 
responsive and rigid practices of the Democratic Party when selecting presidential 
nominees. The intense public pressure finally bore fruit - in order to appease the
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antagonized electorate, the Democratic Party finally agreed to create a 
commission that would consider reforms to the delegate selection process.
4.3 The McGovern-Fraser Commission
Shortly after the 1968 Democratic National Convention, the Democratic Party 
set up an important rules reform committee led by U.S. Senator George McGovern 
(D-SD) and later, after his resignation, by Congressman Donald Fraser (D-MN). 
The McGovern-Fraser Commission produced 18 guidelines concerning 
modifications to the national Democratic party-as-organization, guidelines 
categorized by Marshall into three tracks of reform: assurance of public access, 
prohibition of discrimination, and encouragement of grassroots control.1
The first group of reforms concerned those state organizations that did not 
employ primaries and that imposed restrictions on rank-and-file members in the 
delegate selection procedures. All fees associated with serve as a delegate or 
attending the selection meetings were to be decreased or removed completely, 
and the whole delegation process was to become much more transparent. The 
second track of proposals was focused on enhancement of the role of theretofore 
under-represented groups, such as blacks, women or young people, as it 
expressly barred any discrimination based on race, color, creed, national origin, 
age, or sex in public meetings at all party levels. Moreover, the McGovern-Fraser 
commission introduced the very controversial affirmative action quota system that 
called for representation of minority groups in convention delegation “in 
reasonable relationship to the group’s presence in the population of the state.”2
The most impressive attack on the position of party regulars was the third 
group of reforms. In the brokered convention era, party elites held a virtual 
monopoly over the delegate selection process, and rank-and-file party members 
had only very limited maneuvering space how to verbalize their political 
preferences. However, the proposals of the McGovern-Fraser commission entirely 
changed the hierarchical relations within the party-as-organization -  it banned 
premature delegate selection by restricting it only to the year of the national
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convention, and it drastically curtailed the power of state party committees by 
limiting the total number of delegates appointed by the state party organizations 
only to 10 percent. Moreover, no party official could serve as a delegate on ex 
officio grounds and the filling of vacancies for delegates also became strictly 
regulated.1 As a consequence, party elites could no longer count on automatic 
selection to the national convention since each delegate was subject to specific 
election. Neither could they influence the composition of delegations due to 
restrictions inherent in the provisions of the McGovern-Fraser report.
By 1972, already 40 state organizations fully complied with the guidelines, 
and the remaining ones exhibited fairly high compliance.2 Yet, ironically enough, 
the main contribution of the McGovern-Fraser Commission was not postulated 
explicitly in its provisions at all; it sprang rather indirectly from the very 
quintessence of the reforms since it triggered a proliferation of presidential 
primaries. The state party organizations simply discovered that the primary system 
generates many more incentives for participation and much less controversy than 
the brokered convention system. In 1972, already 22 state organization adopted 
the primary system compared to 15 in 1968, and this number kept on rising 
reaching 30 states in 1976 and 35 in 1980.3
4.4 Other Commissions
The 1972 presidential election gave reform efforts a heavy blow to in the 
Democratic Party because its candidate, George McGovern, experienced a 
crushing defeat in the presidential elections. This naturally stirred castigations of 
the new rules on the part of adversaries who blamed the newly applied 
organizational mechanisms for the unprecedented electoral failure. To revise the 
reform surge and propitiate the dissatisfied party regulars, the Democratic Party 
established a new commission under leadership of Baltimore Councilwoman 
Barbara Mikulski. Much to the relief of the party’s liberal wing, the Mikulski 
Commission upheld the achievements of the McGovern-Fraser commission and 
made only minor concessions to the party elite. As far as the second track of
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reforms is concerned, the Mikulski Commission removed the hotly disputed 
mandatory quota system while retaining affirmative action for minority groups. 
However, more important changes were introduced in the area of grassroots 
control where it raised the proportion of state-appointed delegates to 25 percent 
on the condition of appropriate representation of minorities. Also, it allowed 
Democratic governors, U.S. Senators, and U.S. Representatives to attend the 
national convention but denied them privilege of voting.1
Whereas the aforesaid provisions reinforced the role of party regulars, the 
Mikulski Commission also implemented certain rules that conversely augmented 
the power of the grassroots activists. In the caucus/convention states, any group 
scoring more than 15 percent of the vote at local meetings or later conventions 
was guaranteed proportional representation in the delegation. Also, the Mikulski 
Commission prohibited statewide winner-take-all primaries save in districts smaller 
than congressional districts.2 The purpose of these measures was self-evident -  
to make delegation as much proportionally representative as possible.
The little anticipated boom of primary elections caused considerable alarm 
not only among the party leadership but also in the ranks of reformers due to 
concerns over further debilitation of party’s power to influence the nominating 
process. To reverse this unpropitious trend, the Democratic Party instituted 
another reform commission in 1976, one chaired by a little known politician Morley 
Winograd. However, the public grew tired over the perpetual bickering in the 
Democratic Party, relegating the Winograd Commission deliberations to minor 
media attention. Moreover, it failed to reach its utmost goal and managed only to 
implement relatively modest modifications to the delegate selection process. For 
example, its provisions included restriction of the nominating primaries and 
caucuses to a three month period of the election year, or rules calling for equal 
representation of men and women on each state’s delegation. Moreover, the 
commission adopted a much disputed “bound delegate” rule which imposed an 
obligation on the delegate to vote for the presidential candidate he or she was 
elected on behalf of, hence undermining the classical concept of “freedom of 
conscience.” The Winograd Commission ameliorated the position of party 
leadership by instituting the “add-on” rule which provided for 10 percent in
1 Crotty, William. 1983. Party Reform. N ew  York. Longman inc., pp. 68-71
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additional seats for party regulars or elected politicians, who were not otherwise 
included in state’s delegation, thus lifting the ban on ex-officio delegates and 
creating the so-called “superdelegates.”1
The last important Democratic commission was created in 1980 under 
leadership of North Carolina Governor James B. Hunt, Jr., with the aim of 
strengthening the party-as-organization. Even the Hunt Commission fell short of 
party expectations and its main achievements comprised removal of the unpopular 
“bound delegate” rule and an increase of the “add-on” provision to 25 percent.2
As we can see, the party regulars finally succeeded in reversing some trends 
set by the McGovern-Fraser Commission, yet its legacy left a permanent imprint 
on the structure of the Democratic party-as-organization. It effectively dismantled 
the brokered convention system and enabled the party-in-the-electorate to play a 
much more central role in the nominating process by making “voters, through the 
primary season, the effective choosers of the presidential nominees.”3 Also, the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission significantly conduced to creation of what Herrnson 
terms “institutionalized national parties” owing to the harmonization of party rules 
and standards in selection of national convention delegates.4
4.5 Republican Party Reform
Although it may seem, prima facie, that the Democratic and Republican Party 
should encounter analogous difficulties in the presidential nominating process and 
employ similar institutional mechanisms to counter them, in reality, they form 
rather two totally different worlds as they are rather “distinctively separate entities, 
each with its own traditions, social roots, and organizational and personal values.”5 
In comparison with the massiveness of Democratic Party reforms, those 
implemented by the GOP had a far humbler character. Crotty and Jacobson 
identify two main reasons behind this phenomenon. First, due to its inherently 
conservative quintessence, favoring order and gradual progress, the Republican 
Party did not experience any acute inner crises or any pronounced public attack
1 Crotty, William. 1983. Party Reform. N ew  York. Longman inc., pp. 75-81
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on its political patterns in the 1960s, and hence there was hardly any rationale for 
profound partisan change. Second, the GOP is intrinsically repugnant to 
centralizing tendencies. Rather it advocates state’s rights, which renders any in- 
depth implementation of national standards highly improbable.1
4.6 Procedural Reform
In 1969, mainly under the impact of some achievements made on the part of 
the McGovern-Fraser Commission, the Republican Party instituted the Committee 
on Delegates and Organization (DO Committee) led by the national committee- 
woman Rosemary Ginn and consisting purely of Republican National Committee 
members, a phenomenon which may have foreshadowed the nature of its political 
results. The DO Committee produced several recommendations which included 
opening convention delegate selection local and state meetings to rank-and-file 
party members, reducing fees for delegate candidates, prohibiting ex officio 
delegates, and equalizing representation of men and women, and giving a greater 
share of the delegates to the youth.2 However, in compliance with the principle of 
a subordination of the national party to the state parties, these recommendations 
had little enforcement power and their adoption was left entirely to the arbitrariness 
of individual state organizations, without introducing any sanctions in case of their 
disregard.
The failure of the DO Committee to reach meaningful results somewhat 
exasperated the moderate Republican politicians and, consequently, mainly at 
their instigation, the GOP established the so-called Rule 29 Committee chaired by 
a reformist Wisconsin Republican William A. Steiger in 1972. From its very 
beginnings, the Rule 29 Committee was steeped in controversy because its 
conservative members perceived it to be a direct attack on their established 
positions. Much to their chagrin, the Rule 29 Committee recommended that state 
organizations be required to elaborate “positive [affirmative] action” plans and 
present them to the Republican National Committee. However, the anti-reformers 
eventually prevailed and the Republican National Committee rejected this
1 Crotty, William, and Gary C. Jacobson. 1980. Am erican Parties in Decline. Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, p. 162
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provision by a narrow margin due to the occurrence of serious concerns that the 
plan posed “a threat of party domination from Washington.”1 Instead, a weaker 
version was adopted which, on the one hand, called for greater inclusion of 
minorities into the nominating process but, on the other hand, did not stipulate any 
coercive or penalty mechanisms.
After 1976, “reform efforts” became solely the domain of the Republican 
National Committee’s (RNC) Rules Committee, which effectively blocked up any 
potential proliferation of national standards within the Republican party-as- 
organization, and, in effect, it confined its activities only to certain technicalities in 
convention operations and party rules.2 To sum up, as Longley puts it, “the GOP 
rejected proposals for national party control of delegate selection practices and 
has explicitly adopted rules that protect state delegate selection procedures.”3 As 
a result, hegemony of state parties in the nominating process remained virtually 
intact, at least from the procedural perspective, by the turmoil of the 1960s owing 
to enduring intrinsic Republican reluctance to change overtly, and the Republican 
national organization preserved its status of confederation of state parties. The 
only significant procedural achievement was extensive implementation of the 
primary system, nevertheless, this phenomenon occurred rather as a by-product of 
the new Democratic rules since the individual states principally commenced 
applying this structural mechanism simultaneously to both parties. Hence the 
power of the Republican Party regulars over the presidential nomination process 
did somewhat decline but not on account of codification of any explicit institutional 
modifications.4
Before the 1970s, American political parties were traditionally associated with 
the concept of “cadre parties,” which Beck and Hershey define as an organization 
“run by a relatively small number of leaders and activists,” who “make the 
organization’s decisions, choose its candidates, and select the strategies they
1 Bibby, John F. 1980. “Party Renewal in the National Republican Party.“ In Pomper, Gerald M., ed., Party 
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believe voters will find appealing” with the utmost goal of winning elections.1 Cadre 
parties are the opposite of the so-called mass parties, which “seek to enroll as 
many people as possible in their membership and to make their decisions 
according to the expressed desires of the mass memberships.”2 In other words, 
whereas the cadre party is based upon exclusion, conserves party elites and is 
tied together by the pragmatic goal of winning elections, the mass party rather 
tends to negate elites and ideologically clings to inclusion and representation of 
masses, which is superior to winning elections. Through dramatic increase of 
popular participation and elite accountability, the Democratic Party, according to 
Longley, interrupted the American tradition of cadre parties as it significantly 
approximated to the mass party model. Conversely, the GOP decided to remain 
largely intact by the institutional inclusive reforms and thus “opted to become a 
contemporary derivative of the classical cadre party model.”3
4.7 Organizational Reform
Yet, the Republican Party did become nationally institutionalized and did 
change; however, by choosing a totally different and less ostentatious path than 
the Democratic Party. The Republican Party always showed much greater 
organizational skills than its Democratic counterpart and, even before the 1960s, it 
very much reinforced the position of the RNC by providing it with a full-time 
chairman and numerous staff. This structural innovation enabled more systematic 
procurement of financial resources, which prepared ground for a later massive 
regional expansion of the Republican Party in the direction “top down.” Republican 
nationalization efforts actually predate the political operations of the McGovern- 
Fraser Commission and falls within the tenure of the RNC chairman Ray Bliss, 
who, after catastrophic defeat in the 1964 election, utilized the accumulated 
financial resources for a gradual strengthening of local and state organizations by 
granting them assistance through the Republican National Committee.4
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Strangely enough, one of the most important factors that accelerated 
nationalization of the Republican Party was the adoption of new federal campaign 
finance laws in 1974. Their provisions restricted party donations by individuals to 
$20,000 annually, which intended to target party tendency to raise excessive funds 
during elections. And indeed, in the first years after implementation of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA), the Republican Party found itself in a deep 
financial crisis. For example, in 1975, the RNC managed to raise only $300,000 of 
its $2.3 million budget.1 However, it quickly recovered and responded by 
implementation of a system of direct-mail solicitations, which helped to build “a 
financial empire of millions of small contributors instead of a relative handful of 
financial angels.”2 Although the FECA clearly sided with candidate-centered 
politics, it provided implicit advantages to political parties committees as it 
stipulated that they might receive greater contributions than other committees 
(mainly political action committees (PACs)) or candidates. Simultaneously, the 
national committees could give larger contributions to candidates than individuals 
or other committees.3 Also, in Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S.1 [1976], the Supreme 
Court struck down the limits on independent expenditures of political party 
committees, originally enforced by the FECA, which encouraged them to focus on 
multiple roles and not solely on the one associated with the presidential election 
process.
In 1977, RNC Chair William E. Brock was elected chair of the RNC, the 
Republican Party launched a vast offensive on the dominant position of the 
Democratic Party. By this time, the GOP faced one of its worst electoral nadirs 
ever as it controlled only one third of the seats in Congress, twelve governorships 
and four state legislatures.4 To remedy the ill-stricken Republican Party, Brock 
concentrated the accumulated financial resources upon a massive rebuilding of 
state and local party organizations as he perceived this activity central to the 
process of national party revitalization. In 1977, the RNC implemented a very
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expensive Organizational Director (OD) program (at an annual cost of $1 million), 
which sought to support staff professionalization by paying the salary of an OD in 
each state party organization. However, this project was abandoned in 1979 due 
to increasing financial demands. Also, under Brock’s chairmanship, the RNC set 
up the position of Regional Political Directors (RPDs), whose main task was to 
assist state leaders in the process of strengthening their respective organizations 
and coordinate their utilization of RNC services. Another body under the auspices 
of the RNC, the Regional Finance Directors, concentrated on improving financial 
management of state organizations. In addition, the RNC quickly apprehended the 
potential benefits of IT development and developed a data processing network 
offering a wide range of electronic services to state organizations.1
Primarily, Brock established a new organizational unit called the Local 
Elections Campaign Divisions (LECD), whose task was to prepare elaborate 
strategies with the aim of gaining state legislative seats. It not only monitored and 
analyzed election districts, but also provided extensive services to candidates.2 
RNC activities did not confine only to state legislatures but also pertained to the 
gubernatorial level. In 1977, Brock decided to invigorate the role of the Republican 
Governors Association (RGA), originally founded in 1964, whose operational 
range was analogous to the LECD and it focused chiefly on helping challengers. 
The amount of assistance provided to state parties on the part of the RNC in the 
second half of the 1970s was indeed unparalleled in the partisan history, which is 
aptly illustrated by the following statement of a veteran Midwestern Republican 
state party chairman: “Bill Brock has changed the whole concept of the National 
Committee. The field people we had helping us were the best I have ever seen. 
They gave us staff, resources and money. In the last two years, we’ve had more 
help from the National Committee than in the whole time I’ve been around.”3 It may 
seem that national and state party organizations formed a perfect symbiosis in this 
epoch, yet the latter eventually undertook a small rebellion against rising influence 
of the former. In 1980, the GOP adopted a new provision, Rule 26 (f), which 
conditioned assistance of the Republican National Committee in a campaign by
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consent of the state party chairperson and national committee persons from the 
particular state. However, this limitation did not apply to congressional and Senate 
campaign committees.1
According to Bibby, the reforms implemented under Brock’s leadership 
influenced the future arrangement of state organizations in four distinct areas: 
institutionalization of permanent party headquarters, professionalization of staff, 
more effective state party organization funding, and more extensive candidate 
support and party building. In the era of traditional party organization, state 
organizations had no stable administrative and technical background and the 
location of party headquarters constantly changed depending on the residence of 
their respective leaders. Brock’s reforms helped to suppress the rather casual and 
chaotic nature of state parties and turn them into modern, effectively managed 
institutions, with advanced computer technologies. This led to the greater 
efficiency of campaign management owing to substantial facilitation of fund­
raising, mailings, voter registration, voter contact, and recruiting volunteers. The 
rationalization of party-as-organization at the state level is also associated with a 
re-evaluated staffing policy. Formerly, state party headquarters had limited human 
resources, in most cases only a secretary or executive director and a bunch of 
volunteers, while, nowadays, state party organizations employ today full-time 
professionals including an executive director, field staff, public relations director, 
research staff, fund-raiser etc., which again enhances the outputs on the part of 
state parties.
Naturally, the rebuilding of state organizations was primarily the question of 
money provided by the national party committees. According to Epstein, the 
nationalization of Republican campaign effort can be compared to the federal 
government’s grant-in-aid-system. Under the grant-in-aid-system, the 
administrative units receive financial support associated with certain projects on 
the condition of compliance with federal standards. The Republican Party 
successfully copied this model and transposed it to the partisan level -  to gain 
access to national party funds and other assistance, state parties and candidates 
are obliged to “maintain organizations or conduct campaigns serving general
1 Kayden, Xandra , and Eddie Mahe Jr. 1985. The Party Goes On: The Persistence o f  the Two-Party System  
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Republican purposes.”1 As a result, state parties now both generate substantial 
financial resources themselves through various sophisticated methods of fund­
raising, and they receive vast financial assistance from national party 
headquarters. All of the aforesaid aspects contributed to massive extension of 
services that can be actually provided to candidates: they include candidate 
recruitment, assistance in polling, fund-raising, staff assistance, survey research, 
campaign seminars or media consulting.2 As a consequence, the state parties, per 
se, may have lost their monopoly over the nomination processes. At the same 
time, they have grown substantially stronger and developed complex mechanisms 
to control candidates in a less overt and coercive manner, which very much 
minimizes the “damage” done by the primary system.
4.8 Democratic Response
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Democratic Party achieved the worst 
electoral results since the New Deal realignment as it experienced heavy losses in 
the House of Representatives, lost control of the Senate and its incumbent 
President Jimmy Carter did not get reelected. Such poor showings urged the 
Democratic Party to reassess its organizational policy and thoroughly scrutinize 
the reasons of its unparalleled failure. As a result, through wide consensus among 
DNC members, Congressional Democrats, and partisan activists, the Democratic 
Party decided to duplicate the successful Republican organizational model of 
reform.3 Herrnson associates mainly three men with the Democratic Party renewal 
at the beginning of the 1980s: Charles Manatt (DNC Chair), Tony Coelho 
(Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) Chair), and Lloyd 
Bentsen (Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) Chair), who, 
according to him, made large contributions to “building the national party 
organizations’ fund-raising capabilities, improving their professional staffs and
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organizational structures, and augmenting the Republican model to suit the 
specific needs of Democratic candidates and state and local committees.”1
Nevertheless, the Democratic delayed reaction to the requirements of the 
new era did eventually reflect itself in the fact that it has never really succeeded in 
matching the scope of Republican institutionalization. This failure has been further 
intensified by factors that inherently spring from the very ideological quintessence 
of the Democratic Party, one which tends to attract less educated and less affluent 
voters. Hence the financial benefits of its direct-mail solicitations cannot measure 
to the Republican ones, the gap having been pronounced especially in the first 
years after implementation of Democratic organizational reforms. For example, in 
1982, the DNC’s contributor list included 200,000 names, compared with RNC’s 
list, which boasted itself of 1.7 million names.2 As can be seen in the following 
figure, the DNC also fell behind the RNC substantially in the volume of hard 
money receipts. Even in 1984, in the epoch of heightened Democratic institutional 
efforts, the RNC managed to raise $105.9 million compared to $46.6 million on the 
part of the DNC, which is more than twice as much. In the whole time span 
between 1976 and 2000, this ratio averaged approximately 2.8. The dichotomy 
becomes even more profound if we compare receipts of all the national 
committees, including the congressional ones, where the ratio averaged 3.4 in the 
aforementioned time span. However, if we take into considerations only the recent 
results, then the prospects look much more optimistic for the Democratic Party as 
it managed to close the advantage of the Republican Party from the ratio of 6.7 in 
1980 to 1.7 in 2000.
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Party 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Democrats
DNC 13.1 11.3 15.4 16.5 46.6 17.2 52.3 14.5 65.8 41.8 108.4 64.8 124.0
DCCC .9 2.8 2.9 6.5 10.4 12.3 12.5 9.1 12.8 19.4 26.6 25.2 48.4
DSCC 1.0 .3 1.7 5.6 8.9 13.4 16.3 17.5 25.5 26.4 30.8 35.6 40.5
Total 15.0 14.4 20.0 28.6 65.9 42.9 81.1 41.1 104.1 87.6 165.8 125.6 212.9
Republicans
RNC 29.1 34.2 77.8 84.1 105.9 83.8 91.0 68.7 85.4 87.4 193.0 104.0 212.8
NRCC 12.1 14.1 20.3 58.0 58.3 39.8 34.7 33.2 35.2 26.7 74.2 72.7 97.3
NRSC 1.8 10.9 22.3 48.9 81.7 86.1 65.9 65.1 73.8 65.3 64.5 53.4 51.5
Total 43.0 59.2 120.4 191.0 245.9 209.7 191.6 167.0 194.4 179.4 331.7 230.1 361.6
Table 4.1 National Party Hard Money Receipts, 1976-2000 (in million $) (source: Herrnson, 
Paul S. 2002. “National Organisations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century.“ In Maisel, L. 
Sandy, ed., The Parties Respond, Boulder: Westview Press, 3rd ed, p.55)
The shortage of Democratic funds naturally correlates of party organizations 
with other aspects, e.g. staff size. As we can see in the following figure, in 1972, 
both national committees employed the same number of professional workers, 
namely 32. Nearly twenty years later, in 1990, the Democratic staff amounted only 
to 130 people, whereas the RNC employed 400 staffers or roughly three times as 
many. However, ten years after, in 2000, the ratio already shrank to 1.66 as the 
DNC employed 150 full-time employees, compared to 250 on the part of the RNC, 
which again clearly indicates that the Democratic Party slowly catches up with the 
GOP, even if this ratio is very much distorted by massive reduction of the RNC 
staff in the 1990s.1 To sum up, we may say that the Democratic Party slowly 
closed the gap that resulted because of it belated reaction to the requirements of 
the new dynamic era; yet it seems to be fairly unlikely that it will catch up or even 
surpass the Republican Party in the amount of the funds raised in the near future 
due to its ideological orientation and the composition of its electorate.
1 Herrnson, Paul S. 2002. “National Organisations at the Dawn o f the Twenty-First Century.“ In Maisel, L. 
Sandy, ed., The Parties Respond, Boulder: W estview Press, 3rd ed., p. 58
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Figure 4.1 Staff of national, House, and Senate Committees, both parties, 1976-90 (source: 
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press,p.257)
4.9 Party-Centered vs. Candidate-Centered Elections
Despite structural measures implemented in the Progressive Era, political 
parties still succeeded in conserving their position as central actors to the 
nominating and campaigning processes until the 1960s. If a politician wanted to 
gain access to an elective office, he or she had no choice other than utilizing the 
strictly partisan channels because political parties held virtual duopoly over the 
fundamental means for an office-seeker to get elected -  financial funds, human 
resources, and political know-how. Consequently, ambitious politicians were de 
facto subject to the arbitrariness of local and state party elites, which implied 
compliance with an unwritten agreement -  the party machines supported office- 
seekers as long as the latter conformed to preferred policy of the former. Should a 
political actor decide to revolt against the will of party regulars, he or she risked 
withdrawal of the fundamental resources needed for election or reelection. To put 
it differently, a long-term political career was feasible only within the framework of 
political parties (i.e., local and state party organizations), which, if I should use an 
overstatement, degraded office seekers and office holders to the role of an 
extended hand of party bosses. In short, political actors in the party-centered era
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to a certain extent were forced to put side his or her personal ideology in exchange 
for gaining perquisites flowing from the tenure of the office.
Placing emphasis on regional fragmentation of political parties, Aldrich terms 
the electoral mechanisms prior to the 1960s as “feudal” campaigning since it was 
“rooted in local party organizations, and thus in the geography that defines 
electoral districts, just as feudalism was rooted in land.” It was a “retail” campaign 
because it was bounded geographically and managed by the appropriate state or 
local organizations, which concentrated their efforts on the maintenance and 
reinforcement of loyalties within the electorate and mobilization of voters on 
election day through labor-intensive means.1 Human resources in the form of 
benefit seekers were available because of the spoils system -  the election of a 
party candidate entailed material rewards for them, ranging from patronage jobs to 
distributive policies. Accordingly, the control of office primarily had pragmatic and 
utilitarian dimensions, with ideology playing rather a secondary role.
Albeit the overall effects of Progressive reforms were much shallower than 
originally expected, they managed to create rifts in the concept of party-centered 
elections. The burgeoning governmental apparatus dramatically curtailed the 
power of political parties to provide rewards to office-seekers and benefit-seekers 
as it successfully “usurped” some theretofore strictly partisan policy domains. 
Moreover, the onset of bureaucratization and technocratization enabled office- 
seekers to build long-term governmental careers, rendering them totally 
independent of the organizational mechanisms of political parties. Consequently, 
the Progressive Era irrevocably changed the function of party machines and 
condemned them to inevitable atrophy; yet it took another half a century until the 
party monopoly over access to elective offices was dismantled.
The collapse of party-centered elections can be attributed mainly to two 
pivotal factors: extensive technological changes and rise of policy-motivated 
benefit seekers. Proliferation of mass media, a substantial decrease in travel time 
and subsequent dynamic development of information technologies made it much 
easier for office-seekers to contact potential financial contributors and political 
activists without assistance of political parties. In other words, political parties
1 Aldrich, John H. 1992. Presidential Campaigns in Party- and Candidate-Centered Eras. In Mathew D. 
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ceased to be the sole proprietors of funds and labor for political campaigns and it 
became possible for a candidate to manage a personal campaign despite the will 
of party elites, such as John Fitzgerald Kennedy in I960.1
As already noted, the Progressive surge eventually led to the break-up of the 
patronage-based system, and it marked the end of profit-oriented benefit seekers. 
Instead, an entirely new brand of activists emerged, sometimes referred to as 
“purists” or “amateurs,” who participate in political processes mainly from 
ideological reasons and their goal is to shape policy outcomes.2 As Aldrich puts it, 
while “the patronage-based benefit seeker cared only about whose party made up 
the government, the contemporary policy-based benefit seeker cares primarily 
what government will do.”3 Naturally, external factors urge major American political 
parties to embrace an immensely large scope of diverse interests as they must be 
capable of forging far-reaching coalitions in order to win elections. However, this 
tendency directly contradicts the political activists’ conception of pure policy, hence 
they are more likely to endorse a particular candidate since he represents a much 
more transparent alternative to the intricate maze of a party. As a result, the 1960s 
became an era of unprecedented boom of political activism which assaulted the 
anachronistic and pragmatic quintessence of political parties, their focus only on 
winning elections. As a result, candidates started to gradually step out of obscurity 
of the party’s shadow since the dynamics of the modern era favors an 
individualistic style of campaigning, one with party becoming a partner rather than 
a master to an office-seeker.
Aldrich labels the present system of candidate-centered elections as “bastard 
feudalism,” which is “rooted in personal ambitions as well as in the earlier feudal 
basis of party, and, to a lesser extent, electoral geography.”4 To put it differently, 
the primary incentive of the benefit-seekers to focus on a particular candidate is no
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why P arties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 270-271
2 Wildavsky, Aaron. 1965. “The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and the Two-Party System,” 
Review o f  Politics, vol. 27, p. 393, and Wilson, James 0 .  1962. The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics, in 
Three Cities, Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, p.2
3 Aldrich, John H. 1992. Presidential Campaigns in Party- and Candidate-Centered Eras. In Mathew D. 
McCubbins, ed., Under the Watchful Eye: M anaging Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era, 
Washington D.C.: CQ Press, p. 69
4 Aldrich, John H. 1992. Presidential Campaigns in Party- and Candidate-Centered Eras. In Mathew D. 
McCubbins, ed., Under the Watchful Eye: Managing Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era, 
Washington D.C.: CQ Press, p. 61
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longer land in the form of patronage and distributive policies but rather influence 
over the policy outputs. The benefit-seekers and the candidates have hence 
formed a perfect mutualism on the quid pro quo basis: the former provide the latter 
with the vitally important financial and human resources and technologies in 
exchange for their share on the power.
If I should note a hyperbole, the 1960s became a watershed between two 
distinct epochs: “the era of partisan planned economy” and “the era of partisan 
market economy.” In the partisan planned economy system, party organizations 
virtually regulated and controlled the flow of financial and human resources 
associated with campaigning and centrally planned how much assistance will be 
provided to a particular candidate. As a result, a candidate was rendered fully 
dependant on the arbitrariness of few party regulars since they made the final 
decisions concerning production, allocation and consumption of goods and 
services for political campaigns. However, with the onset of media, and 
dynamization and computerization of society, new producers and providers of 
goods and services arose in the form of political activists, implying the loss of the 
so carefully guarded monopoly over funds, labor, and technology available to a 
candidate. In other words, political parties no longer held an extraordinary place in 
the electoral arena since many other gladiators set their foot in their theretofore 
sacred preserve. Consequently, due to the rise of competitors and massive 
development of the new campaigning market, political parties were forced to 
modify their approach to office-seekers whose price started to rise spectacularly in 
the mean-time. Production, allocation, and consumption of campaign goods and 
services lost many barriers that had been artificially imposed by political parties. 
The whole campaigning process began to be governed by the classical market 
economy rules.
The freshly lost monopoly over campaign resources became reflected in 
creation of a sword of Damocles over political parties: they could either passively 
conserve their intrinsic mechanisms, thus risking fatal consequences, or they 
could actively reassess their time-worn partisan principles and try to hold out and 
survive within the changed context of electoral competition. As always, the 
Democratic and Republican parties exhibited great sense of pragmatism and 
resourcefulness in dealing with intricate and arduous situations and voluntarily 
accepted the implications of the new individualistic-centered era and renounced a
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certain share of political power by means of extensive reforms in the 1970s, rather 
than follow the self-destructive path of obstinate insistence on unconditional 
subordination of political actors to the cause of the party. As a result, political 
parties no longer function as monopolistic producers of political candidates who 
directly influence the content and form of the political market. Rather they have 
assumed the role of a provider of goods and services to political candidates, 
retaining extensive influence upon the processes within the electoral arena. As 
Aldrich puts it, the 1970s witnessed the emergence of a new form of political 
party, “one that is ‘in service’ to its ambitious politicians but not ‘in control’ of 
them,” as the one that was conceived in the 1820s by Martin van Buren.1. By virtue 
of their organizational reform, political parties have become much more effective 
and professional in producing and allocating goods and services needed by the 
candidate to succeed in elections. Hence they have become a much more 
competitive and central participant in the battle of winning influence over the 
individual candidates than many political scientists would have thought after the 
seeming decomposition of the political parties in the 1960s.
Formerly, political cards were laid openly on the table: party bosses made the 
decisions and ambitious office-seekers had to obey and conform to them if they 
were to build up a decent political career. Now the situation has become much 
less explicit and much more complex. From certain perspectives, it may seem that 
a candidate has actually become hierarchically superior to the political party which, 
as some indications may imply, has been degraded to the humble position of a 
“servant.” However, appearances may be deceiving since it is sometimes the 
’’servants” who effectively manage the household with their masters being 
confined to a largely representative role, and such is the case of American political 
parties. Servants can do without their master, yet a master can hardly do without 
his servants. Political parties may have retreated to the background, but they have 
developed mechanisms to skillfully manipulate candidates in a more 
inconspicuous manner -  they provide them with extensive services, which 
becomes reflected to a substantial degree in the dependence of the office-seekers 
on the “invisible” hands of the party. Formally, the candidate functions as an
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in Am erica, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 273
60
autonomous unit -  he or she can seek support from various political channels and 
build up his own campaign organizations. Yet the massive scope of resources 
provided by the party-as-organization is nearly irresistible, and it is this irresistibility 
of their goods and services that makes the political parties so strong in the 
contemporary era.
In addition to possession of substantial resources, political parties have 
retained another vitally important feature -  their “brand.” The brand of the major 
parties still serves as a basic orientation for voters as it gives them some 
fundamental clues what to exactly expect from the given “product.” No other label 
since the 1860s has ever succeeded in attracting the voters more powerfully than 
those of the Democratic and Republican parties. As a result, the very affiliation of 
the politicians with the major parties brings one big certainty -  “the quality and 
tradition of the brand,” which further greatly increases the value of the major 
parties in the electoral market.
4.10 Conclusion
In his masterpiece Politics, Parties, Pressure Groups, V. O. Key, Jr. 
describes the relationship between the national parties and state parties as largely 
autonomous and confederative, with the two major parties resembling rather a 
disorganized association of 50 loosely-knitted partisan units.1 Such a scenario is 
aptly described by Schlesinger as the “centrifugal multinuclear party,” which 
implies existence of a multitude of nuclei diverging from the center.2 Necessarily, 
the frustration concerning the impossibility of implementing coordinated strategies 
due to intrinsic fragmentation, coupled with a correlative increasing inability to 
address the public needs, generated important incentives for profound change of 
the system. In order to counter the challenges of the new era, the Democratic 
Party introduced a procedural reform, based on the enforcement of national party 
standards, yet the irreconcilable differences between the reformers and party 
regulars over the extent of reforms brought the whole process to a stalemate, 
having only a minor impact on the strengthening and modernization of the national 
party organization. On the other hand, the Republican Party followed a totally
' Key, V.O., Jr. 1964. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 6th ed , New York:Crowell, p. 334
2 Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1991. Political Parties and the Winning o f  Office, Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, p. 177
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different path and implemented a much more clever strategy -  by virtue of new 
federal campaign laws, which encouraged a more extensive collaboration under 
the aegis of the national party organization, it started to strengthen the party center 
through a vast redistribution of the funds raised on the national level among the 
state parties, thus effectively subjugating them by financial means. Inspired by the 
Republican success, the Democratic Party copied this strategy at the beginning of 
the 1980s, and, as a result, in Schlesinger’s terminology, both the Democratic and 
Republican parties have become “centripetal multinuclear parties,” as the state 
parties no longer have the tendency to diverge from the center but rather 
substantially converge to it.1 Given the largely insignificant and subordinate 
position of the national political parties in relationship to the state parties in the 
traditional party organization system, their roles have reversed and the former 
slaves have actually become the present masters. Sabato aptly comments on this 
irony with the following words: “The national parties were once creatures of the 
state affiliates and financed by them; today, the state parties are chartered 
chapters of Washington-based groups, and they owe much of their health to the 
national party committees.”2
Paradoxically enough, the analogy of slaves becoming masters might also 
seem to fit the relationship between the candidates and political parties. With the 
onset of mass media and computers and appearance of a brand new breed of 
policy-motivated activists, it has become much easier for a candidate to build his 
own campaign organization outside the “moloch” of the political party. Hence, it 
may seem that the present “individualism-friendly” era substantially marginalized 
the political party and decreased its relevancy. However, such a conclusion has 
one major hitch -  the recent institutionalization and professionalization of political 
parties became reflected in better quality and greater quantity of provided 
services, relegating other competitors in the electoral market to a largely 
secondary role. As we all know, money makes the world go round, and the political 
parties, owing to their organizational reforms, can now generate substantial 
amounts of funds and thus effectively buy the favor of the political actors.
1 Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1991. P olitical Parties and the Winning o f  Office, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, p. 187
2 Sabato, Larry J. 1988. The P a rty’s Just Begun. Shaping Political Parties fo r  America's Future, Brown 
College Division: Scott, Foresman and Company, p. 90
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Consequently, candidates may be independent formally, but they are still largely 
dependent financially, which renders, though covertly, political parties still 
extremely relevant to the election process.
63
5 Party-in-the-Electorate
The central thesis of the general decline of political parties is usually based 
upon an intensive weakening of party allegiance. Throughout this chapter, I try to 
impugn this commonly accepted assumption and show that even this final 
component of the Key-Sorauf triad no longer degenerates. First, I present basic 
characteristics of the “mythologization” era when the voting behavior was primarily 
determined by ingrained psychological ties. Then, I observe the critical era of the 
1960s, when the extensive “demythologization” of the American electorate 
occurred, one correlating with a rise of a new type of independents. Finally, I 
analyze the changed perception of political parties by the American public and 
assess the strength of political parties in the electorate.
5.1 Mythologization Era
The phenomenon of partisan mythos, the substance of which is rather devout 
veneration of the “shrine” of political party without seeing its inherent flaws, 
peacefully survived in American politics for approximately 130 years, experiencing 
only little turbulences, e.g. in the ante-bellum era. Even in the 1950s, V. O. Key, Jr. 
still characterizes electoral behavior as rather steeped in “inertia” and observes 
that “the time of casting a ballot is not a time of decision for many voters; it is 
merely an occasion for the reaffirmation of a partisan faith of long-standing.”1 
Partisan loyalties ran deeply under the skin of the voters, with policy issues being 
subordinated to the very idea of the political party. The affiliation with political 
parties functioned similarly to religious cults with reason {logos) playing a largely 
secondary role here. To put it differently, the emotional or affective components of 
partisanship in the mythologization era (roughly 1830s -  1960s) preponderated the 
cognitive aspects as follows from the conclusions of the classical work on voting 
behavior, The American Voter, which appeared in 1960:
In characterizing the relation of individual to party as psychological identification we invoke a 
concept that has played an important if somewhat varied role in psychological theories of the 
relation of individual to individual or of individual to group. We use the concept here to characterize
1 Key, V.O., Jr. 1953. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 3rd e d . , New York:Crowell, p. 582
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the individual’s affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment. 1 (emphasis 
added)
According to the findings by Campbell et al., the dominant feature that 
shaped affective partisan identification at the time of publication of The American 
Voter (and obviously in a myriad decades prior to it) was the influence of family, 
with partisan loyalties effectively passing “from one generation to the next,” hence 
having a hereditary character.2 As a result, the preference of a political party, 
implemented through the intermediate social milieu in childhood, had the tendency 
to remain invariable throughout one’s life, entailing only limited responsiveness to 
the very performance of the political parties. Joseph Schlesinger aptly 
characterizes such voting behavior as based on “rigidities,” which are “factors that 
limit variations in voting behavior....and thus exclude such short-run influences as 
the qualifications of the candidates or immediate issues.”3 Naturally, rigidities imply 
high levels of partisanship and straight-ticket voting, i.e., voting for the same party 
under all circumstances, which can be regarded as a fundamental quintessence of 
the party-in-the-electorate in the mythologization era.
5.2 Rise of Independents
The 1960s represent a landmark in the historical development of the party-in- 
the-electorate because partisan ties underwent a profound change in this epoch. 
The artificially established cult of political parties no longer seemed to fascinate 
and attract voters, and the intense partisan loyalties from the mythologization era 
started to erode drastically. In the 1952-1964 period, strong partisans made up on 
an average of more than one third of the populace, with Independents forming only 
one fifth. However, the decade after 1964 witnessed unprecedented reversal in 
partisan allegiance. As a result, in 1974, the number of strong identifiers amounted 
only to one fourth of the electorate, while the number of Independents surged to 
38 percent.4 No wonder the aforementioned figures led the authors of the classical
1 Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes.[1960] 1980. The American 
Voter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint, p. 121
2 Ibid. 147
3 Schlesinger, Joseph A.1985. The New American Political Party, American Political Science Review, vol.79, 
p. 1166
Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik 1976. The Changing American Voter. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, p. 49
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study, The Changing American Voter (1976), to conclude that “perhaps the most 
dramatic change in the American public over the past two decades has been the 
decline of partisanship.”1
The independents traditionally, and perhaps legitimately, did not enjoy very 
positive connotations, and many political scientists treated them with great disdain 
owing to their intrinsic propensity to be apolitical and apathetic. This can be after 
all illustrated by the following uncomplimentary excerpt from The American Voter, 
which contrasts them with an ideal archetype of civic virtue:
The ideal of Independent citizen, attentive to politics, concerned with course of government, who 
weighs the rival appeals of a campaign and reaches a judgement that is unswayed by partisan 
prejudice, has had such a hold on civic education today -  that one could easily suppose that its 
habitual partisan has the more limited interest and concern with politics. But if the usual image of 
the Independent voter is intended as more than a normative ideal, it fits poorly the characteristic of 
the Independents in our samples. Far from being more attentive, interested, and informed, 
Independents tend as a group to be somewhat less involved in politics. They have somewhat 
poorer knowledge of the issues, their image of the candidates is fainter, their interest in the 
campaign is less, their concern over the outcome is relatively slight, and their choice between 
competing candidates, although it is indeed made later in the campaign, seems much less to spring 
from discoverable evaluations of the elements of the national politics.2
Yet, in the course of time, some political scientists started to gradually 
reassess these sharp judgments from The American Voter and subject the 
category of independents to a more thorough scrutiny, which eventually became 
reflected in partial rehabilitation of this term. The 1960s witnessed a rise of a new 
breed of independents, one which, paradoxically enough, very much fits the 
category of the exemplary politically conscious citizen as defined in The American 
Voter. For example, already by 1970, Burnham inferred that “there exist at least 
two sets of independents: “old independents” who correspond to the rather bleak 
classical survey-research picture, and “new independents” who may have declined 
to identify with either majority party not because they are relatively politically 
unconscious, but because the structure of electoral politics at the present time 
turns on parties, issues, and symbolisms, which do not have much meaning in
1 Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik 1976. The Changing American Voter. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, p. 47
2 Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes.[1960] 1980. The American  
Voter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Midway Reprint, p. 143
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terms of their political values or cognitions.”1 According to his findings, these new 
independents usually belonged to a higher strata of society, falling into a group 
with college education and better-than-average income, and presumably were also 
more interested in political issues.2 The theory of a new independent was further 
elaborated by Pomper, who terms these species as “behavioral independents” 
because they “switch votes from one election to other,” hence making electoral 
decisions based on the content of individual policies presented to them rather than 
on some psychological affiliations.3 As Pomper’s research showed, the new 
independents were no longer ignorant of political matters but, on the other hand, 
they showed a vivid interest in issues, candidates, and their ideological orientation, 
thereby “largely eliminating the cognitive gap” between them and strong 
partisans.4 Moreover, as Keith et al. demonstrate, the new independents are not 
as “independent” as it may seem and function rather as “closet Democrats and 
Republicans,” due to their relatively high interest in voting and partisan contests in 
general.5
Formerly, in the mythologization era, political parties skillfully utilized 
substantial scarcity of informational sources, with voters functioning rather as 
passive receivers of the “sacred” partisan dogma. The relative monopoly of 
political parties over access to political data became transposed into augmentation 
of the impact of their cult since, as it has been proved many times in history, 
ignorance is a fertile ground for efficient manipulation. However, with the onset of 
the dynamic development of high technology, political parties lost effective control 
over distribution of political information due to the rise of new alternative 
communication channels which helped to increase political awareness without 
party’s assistance. The media “massage” with diverse issues and multi-faceted 
views on them forced the electorate to become more engaged in critical analysis 
of party programs and more responsive to governmental policies and 
performance.
1 Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the M ainsprings o f  American Politics. N ew  York: 
Norton, p. 127
2 Ibid, p. 130
3 Pomper, Gerald M. 1972. Voter’s Choice: Varieties o f  American Electoral Behavior. New York: Dodd, 
Mead, p. 32
4 Ibid, p. 33
5 Keith, Bruce E. et al., 1992, The Myth o f  the Independent Voter, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, p. 4
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Another factor that contributed to the growth of new independents in the 
1960s was the growth in general level of education in the American society, one 
which implies more complex and efficient treatment of political knowledge. This, 
again, increases the overall independence from the party cues and leads to 
greater dynamism in the electorate. According to Pomper, “with more schooling, 
persons are better to assimilate political data and to use the information they 
acquire outside of factional channels.”1 The growing correlation between formal 
education and an inclination to be independent can be illustrated by the following 
figures: in 1944, 47 percent of those having a college degree identified themselves 
with the Republican Party, 31 percent with the Democratic Party, and 
independents trailed considerably with only 22 percent. In 1973, the proportion 
looked totally different: independents moved to the lead with 38 percent of the 
college-educated electorate, with Democrats finishing second with 32 percent and 
Republicans third with 30 percent.2
We can say that the mixture of the two aforementioned changes in partisan 
orientation largely contributed to a pronounced distortion of ingrained partisan ties 
and their substitution for increased volatility within the party-in-the-electorate. As 
Ladd and Hadley aptly put it: “the massive increase in formal education and the 
role of the electronic media -  along with a more diffuse set of changes attendant 
on entry into a society characterized by affluence, advanced technology, high 
physical mobility, and impersonalization -  have produced an electorate, which is 
so fluid as to obviate the old ‘star and satellite’ majority and minority party 
relationship.”3 The 1960s simply became an epoch when, applying Schlesinger’s 
terminology, the voting climate began to become rather hostile to rigidities and 
favorable to generation of “flexibilities,“ which he characterizes as “structural 
factors that permit variations and attitudes that emphasize short-run, immediate 
factors.”4 With the occurrence of reliable and detached mass media and a 
generally better informed society, the artificially created mythos became exposed 
to the rising pressure of new communication channels which had the tendency to
1 Pomper, Gerald M. 1972. Voter’s Choice: Varieties o f  American E lectoral Behavior. New York: Dodd, 
Mead, p. 35
2 Ladd, Everett C., with Charles D. Hadley. 1975. Transformations o f  the American Party System. New York: 
Norton, p. 292-293
3 Ibid, p. 303
4 Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1985. “The New American Political Party,” American Political Science Review, 
vol.79, p. 1166
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subject its fundamental quintessence to substantial objectivization and 
relativization, thus considerably eroding it. Mythos simply cannot thrive in the era 
dominated by rapid dissemination of information. To use an analogy to Kant’s 
famous dictum, then the 1960s can be perceived as the voter’s release from his 
self-incurred tutelage, hence assuming the role of Enlightenment in American 
political history.1
With the inevitable attenuation of mythos, the electorate started to be 
predominantly governed by logos, i.e. cognitive attitude towards political parties, 
which understandably heralded the onset of a new epoch which I term as a 
“secularization era” due to the effective break-up of the sacred cult of political 
parties. A typical voter of the secularization era looks at political parties with more 
caution and deliberation and with less emotional involvement. In other words, 
voting decisions are no longer predominantly shaped by psychological links to 
political parties, rather they are shaped by “a kind of calculation by the voter, in 
which he or she computes a ‘running tally’ of party preference.”2 According to the 
conclusions by Fiorina, basically two variables enter into the cognitive process of 
party evaluations on the part of the rational voter of the modern age: assessment 
of past governmental performance and future expectations.3 Casting a ballot is 
simply the output of the comparative study of the expected future benefits which 
are based on the retrospective analysis of the given party and candidate. As 
Popkin puts it, the voter utilizes the so-called “low information rationality“ or “gut 
reasoning,” which is a “method of combining, in an economical way, learning and 
information from past experiences, daily life, the media, and political campaigns.”4 
He uses the term “low information“ since the modern voters usually do not utilize 
thorough and intensive political knowledge, rather they rely on their assessment of 
the data provided by intermediary channels in the form of mass media, while 
consequently confronting their conclusions in communication with other people. As 
a result, their analysis of the electoral market is largely based upon cognitive
1 Originally, Kant’s dictum reads as follows: “Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred 
tutelage.”
2 Pomper, Gerald M. and Marc D. Weiner: “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party Voter. The Evolving 
Bases of Partisanship.” In Green, John C. and Paul Herrnson. 2002. Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution 
o f American Political Parties since 1950, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, p. 186
3 Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, p. 198
4 Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.7
69
shortcuts, but this is still great progress in comparison with irrationality inherent in 
the mythologization era.
The rationalization of the individual consumers of electoral “goods” is closely 
associated with the increased volatility of the party-in-the electorate, a 
phenomenon which can be demonstrated in the substantial increase of split-ticket 
voting, i.e., voting for candidates of different parties for various positions. As 
follows from the following figure, in the 1950s, less than 30 percent of voters split 
their tickets at the state and local level and 10 to 15 percent at the national level, 
while, in 1980, this proportion doubled to 60 percent at the state and local level 
and to more than 30 percent at the national level.
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Figure 5.1 Split-ticket voting, full electorate 1952-1992 (source: Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why 
Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, p.268)
Such a trend may seem to be consistent with dealignment theories that stress 
ongoing attenuation of partisan loyalties.1 However, if we analyze Figure 5.1 more 
closely, we can see a surprising gradual decline in the split-ticket voting towards 
the 1990s, a decline which suggests a renewal of partisan loyalties. As we can 
see, 1980 undoubtedly represents a nadir in the party identification. However, 
since then partisan allegiance has risen a little, thus uprooting pessimistic
1 For example, Carmines, Edwards G., John P. Mclver, and James A. Stimson. 1987: “Unrealized 
Partisanship: A  Theory o f Dealignment,” Journal o f  Politics, Volume 49, pp. 376-400
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perspectives about political parties on the part of dealignment thesis supporters.1 
Yet, one has to emphasize the fact that the strength of partisan ties in the recent 
era can by no means match their intensity in the mythologization era. The increase 
in partisan affiliation presumably can be attributed to the strengthening of party-as- 
organization. In the 1960s and 1970s, this component of the Key-Sorauf triad was 
steeped in chaos and substantially debilitated, the first signs of regeneration 
occurring around 1980, paralleling the trend of the partisan allegiance. The 
nationalization and institutionalization of political parties simply entailed increased 
effectivity of voter recruitment and loyality reinforcement. Still, future regression to 
the golden age of partisanship of the pre-1960 era is extremely unlikely, especially 
taking into account the changed dynamism of electoral conditions.
5.3 Changed Attitude of the Electorate Towards Political Parties
In 1976, the authors of The Changing American Voter noticed strong anti­
partisan sentiments within the electorate and hence made the following bleak 
comments about American political parties:
The next step in the story is obvious. A more politically involved public with more coherent 
political views runs right into the troubles of the late 1960s. The result: a growing disenchantment 
with government -  reflected in the sharp rise of distrust in the government. The issues of the 
1960s, furthermore, do not clearly coincide with party lines; thus the parties offer no meaningful 
alternatives that might tie citizens more closely to them. Thus the political parties reap the results of 
disaffection. Citizens come to look at the parties in more negative terms; they also begin to 
abandon parties in growing numbers.2
According to Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, the public no longer saw differences 
between the parties and exceedingly distrusted the government, which, according 
to them, augured inevitable decomposition of political parties. Luckily enough, the 
future development proved the dissatisfaction thesis and the related apocalyptic 
visions wrong as follows from the following figure:
' Lawrence, David G. 2001. “On the Resurgence of Party Identification in the 1990s.“ In Cohen, Jeffrey E., 
Richard Fleisher, and Paul Kantor, e d s American P olitical Parties. Decline or Resurgence? Washington 
D.C.: CQ Press, p. 33
2 Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik 1976. The Changing American Voter. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, p. 283
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Figure 5.2 Affective evaluations of the political parties, 1952-92 (source: Aldrich, John H. 
1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, p.249)
As we can see, the end of the 1960s and onset of the 1970s merely 
exhibited an unprecedented surge of negative partisan sentiments which can be 
apparently associated with the general decline of all components of the Key- 
Sorauf triad in this epoch. The year 1968 was simply the time of major social 
turmoils and protests against the general non-responsiveness of political parties, 
and it functioned as a catharsis of the accumulated antagonisms and antipathies 
on the part of the electorate, with the faith in political parties and government 
gradually rising thenceforth. As a result, the ominous conclusions of Nie et al. were 
simply distorted by short-term influences, resulting from the general extremely 
antipartisan spirit of the time. Yet, the year 1968 seems to be the landmark also for 
another phenomenon -  the increase of neutral attitudes towards both parties, 
which implies that the voters increasingly perceive political parties neither 
positively nor negatively because they are irrelevant to them. As Wattenberg puts 
it, “the decline of parties in the electorate has been more a function of a reduction 
in saliency,” which he considers “as a long-term secular trend and such trends are 
usually difficult to reverse.”1
' Wattenberg, Martin P. 1986. The Decline o f  American Political Parties: 1952-1984, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, p. 51
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The increased irrelevance of political parties is further demonstrated by the 
following figure. As we can see, the Democratic and Republican parties exhibit 
similar degree of neutrality, hence the irrelevance is not confined just to one of 
them. Also, since 1960, the voters have been asked which of the two parties was 
more likely to counter “the most important problems facing the country.”1 At the 
very beginning of this survey, only approximately 25 percent of the respondents 
thought that neither party could do so, a portion which jumped to roughly 40 
percent in 1968 and further to around 50 percent in the 1980s.
♦  IO .LIR —♦*- No Party Better MV* - Ж -  Neubral to  Dems
- Э -  NeutraJ to  Reps t Ét  Party No Alien
Figure 5.3 Indications of the irrelevance of parties, 1952-92 (source: Aldrich, John H. 1995.
Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, p 251)
A student of political parties may be puzzled if he or she looks at the following 
figure assessing the perception of party differences by the electorate. As we can 
see, although the voters view political parties as more and more irrelevant, they 
increasingly perceive differences between the political parties. Whereas in 1972, in 
the climax of party decline, only 50 percent of the electorate discerned party 
differences, this proportion amounted nearly to 70 percent in 2000. The 
explanation of such increase lies at hand and is based upon factors that have 
been already dealt with throughout this thesis: rationalization of the electorate and
1 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation o f  Party Politics in America, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, p. 250
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actual increase in party differences.1 Since the modern voter handles political 
information in a more sophisticated and efficient manner, it is self-evident that his 
or her ability to recognize interparty dichotomies must improve assuming that it is 
an objective phenomenon.
Figure 5.4 Perceptions of party differences (percentage of respondents who indicate a 
perception in what the parties stand for [1952-92]) (source: Pomper, Gerald M. and Marc D. 
Weiner: “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party Voter. The Evolving Bases of Partisanship.” In 
Green, John C. and Paul Herrnson. 2002. Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution of American 
Political Parties since 1950, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, p.185)
Yet, such an explication of party differences as perceived by the electorate 
does not itself clarify the puzzle of the simultaneous growth of party irrelevance in 
the eyes of voters. The great irony is the fact that the parties were stronger in the 
electorate when they exhibited fewer differences and their programs overlapped. 
Such a seeming contradiction may be best elucidated through the changed 
function of the party-as-organization. As Ladd and Hadley put it, ”as personal 
images become more salient, the importance of the party label to the voting 
decision must lessen.”2 The boom of the mass media and personalized campaigns 
simply pushed political parties out of the limelight, and replaced them with 
candidates in that erstwhile role. Whereas political parties formerly played the
1 Pomper, Gerald M. and Marc D. Weiner: “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party Voter. The Evolving 
Bases of Partisanship.” In Green, John C. and Paul Herrnson. 2002. Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution 
o f  American Political Parties since 1950, Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, p. 189
2 Ladd, Everett C., with Charles D. Hadley. 1975. Transformations o f  the American Party System. New York: 
Norton, p. 301
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leading part on the electoral stage, they now have moved behind the scenes. 
Hence it has become very difficult for the spectators to actually see them. 
Wattenberg aptly notes that “the ideological differences between the parties may 
remain but on the crucial short-run policy issues of the day it is the candidates that 
now matter most.”1 In other words, if the public now perceives political parties to 
be more and more polarized, it is mainly due to the “heralds” of their program -  
candidates since the parties, per se, have grown increasingly invisible. However, 
as we have already learned, the invisibility of political parties does not mean that 
they decline. On the contrary, one is tempted to say that the current strength of 
political parties lies primarily in existence of this invisibility since it has forced them 
to act and to reassess their obsolete structural mechanisms, mechanisms which 
entailed subsequent strengthening and modernization of their organizational 
structures.
5.4 Conclusion
The American voter of the mythologization era was largely passive, only 
reacting to party initiatives. No wonder that this entity was castigated in the Report 
of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Association. 
According to the Committee, the ideal voter would affiliate with political parties “in 
terms of support of [their] program, rather in terms of personalities, patronage, and 
local matters.”2 Their dream did not come true entirely because the present 
candidate-centered era generates great incentives for voters to associate 
themselves with candidates. Yet the fundamental idea of more responsive voter 
eventually became a reality.
Shortly after the publication of the Report, in the 1960s, a changed American 
voter appeared, one rather unburdened by rigid psychological ties and 
pragmatically weighing the investment benefits of his vote. As a result, present 
electorate much resembles a rational consumer of goods in the market economy -  
they choose that kind of a product that will benefit them most. No wonder that 
under such circumstances, partisan strength eroded in the electorate, and the
1 Wattenberg, Martin P. 1986. The Decline o f  American Political Parties: 1952-1984, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, p. 58
2 Committee on Political Parties. American Political Science Association. 1950a. “Towards a more 
Responsible Party System.” American Political Science Review, vol. 44. Supplement, p. 69
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roots of voter loyalties became shallower. The phenomenon of attenuation of 
partisan loyalties became reflected in a plethora of skeptical sentiments on the 
part of political scholars who seemed to vie with each other over who would bring 
the gloomiest prophecies about the fate of American political parties. None of them 
has really materialized; political parties still fulfill their electoral function, and they 
are able to attract voters under completely different circumstances than in the 
mythologization era. The phenomenon of weakened partisan links did not appear 
primarily as a result of a malfunction of political parties. Rather it appeared as a 
natural consequence of the new dynamic era characterized by the rising influence 
of mass media and better-educated voters. While it may have seemed that the 
changed social and political environment environment was effectively killing 
political parties, they managed to avert the danger of their doom, as they have 
done many times in their history, and they have shown excellent abilities to adapt 
themselves to the requirements of the changed political context. They have 
countered the severe decline of partisan affiliation by enhanced organization which 
effectively stopped the aforesaid negative trend and even reversed it, although the 
return to the age of golden partisanship is, perhaps fortunately, extremely 
improbable.
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6 Evaluation of Contemporary American Political Parties
There is still one essential question that needs to be answered -  are the 
contemporary political parties in decline or resurgence? For an eager student of 
American parties, the following answer will probably sound not very satisfactory 
and perhaps disappointing as they find themselves both in the stage of decline 
and resurgence. It may seem that such a conclusion did not unravel the mystery of 
American political parties and the goal of this thesis has thus not been met as 
such a postulation only affirms the schizophrenia mentioned at the very beginning. 
Yet, such a harsh condemnation is more than precipitate due to the substantial 
complexity of American political parties, which has already been more than 
abundantly manifested throughout this thesis. Surely enough, they find themselves 
in decline but this decline began already at the turn of the 19th century, thus being 
of a long-term character, and it can be rather attributed to non-controllable external 
factors, such as vast social changes within American society. Moreover, political 
parties lost their power because they have grown more democratic, by increasing 
their responsiveness to the grassroots and electorate in general. It is this 
democratic quality that renders them, at least from ideological perspectives, 
immensely vigorous.
Moreover, the thesis of resurgence of political parties does not have its 
justification only in their “democratization,“ but it rests also on other factors. After 
the attack on party's omnipotence in the form of Progressivism at the beginning of 
the 20th century, political parties severely declined and submerged into the era of 
“party debilitation.“ In this epoch, political parties were characterized by the 
practical non-existence of a party center, lack of cohesion in the Congress, and 
relative disregard of an ordinary voter. This led the Committee on Political Parties 
of the American Political Science Association to subject the very mechanism of 
political parties to heavy criticism, while also presenting some apocalyptic visions 
about their future development in its 1950 Report. In spite of rapidly changing 
outer conditions, political parties seemed to be complacent in peaceful 
preservation of their realm up to the 1960s, when the discrepancies between the 
party-as-organization and party-in-the-electorate were no longer tolerable, 
resulting into great social turmoils. The unprecedented antagonism towards
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political parties at the end of the 1960s even intensified the doubts of many 
political scientists about the viability of political parties and triggered a plethora of 
political obituaries, positing that political parties could no longer fulfill their proper 
function in the changed political and social environment.
Yet, as I have shown in this thesis, the parties responded, refusing slow but 
relatively comfortable dying, and chose rather a thorny path in the form of painful 
reforms that sometimes substantially curtailed their power (e.g. primary elections). 
Nevertheless, one should emphasize that the main incentive for change came 
from the voters, from the party-in-the-electorate, as a result of newly gained 
political knowledge, which cast political parties into a totally different light. The 
“informational boom“ eventuated that voters rebelled and stopped being mere 
passive and obedient absorbers of party programs. As a result, they started to 
dictate the rules of the political game and not the political parties. In the present 
era, the affiliation of voters is no longer won automatically as in the 
mythologization era and political parties must meticulously “pamper“ the voter and 
take heed to his or her needs. In the sixth party system, voters continuously 
analyze and evaluate the performance of political parties and, as a consequence, 
political parties must try hard to bring fourth programs to which they commit 
themselves if they want to gain sufficient support in the next elections. If I should 
describe the historical development of the party-in-the-electorate in one phrase, 
than an apt choice would be the triumph of logos over mythos, due the rise of the 
reasoning voter in the second half of the 20th century. The flexibility in choosing 
party allegiance does not necessarily mean alienation from the political party as 
some dealignment theorist would infer since, as we have seen, the phenomenon 
of a “vanishing voter“ was limited only to the 1960s and 1970s. In this chaotic 
period, affectual loyalties were simply being transformed into less stable cognitive 
partisanship, hence presenting a watershed between the era of party 
mythologization and era of party secularization.
If I should make a bold prediction about the future of American political 
parties, nor another realignment seems to be probable as the phenomenon of 
rational voters naturally logically entails a counter-reaction in the form of rational 
political parties. In order to reverse the trend of attenuation of partisan ties, political 
parties introduced highly professionalized and nationalized organizations, which 
rendered the whole battle over the favor of the voter increasingly competitive.
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Naturally, vigorous competition does not usually imply long-lasting conservation of 
a status quo, and the associated flexibility inherently generates a hostile 
environment for any future realignment. The future scenario may very likely 
include regular alternation of political parties in power, with neither being capable 
of winning any permanent majorities.
Also, rationalization of the electorate became reflected in diminution of 
ideological discrepancies within the individual political parties. Whereas formerly 
voters tended to repeatedly cast their ballot for the very label or form of political 
party, very frequently disregarding the content, now the voters predominantly 
decide on the basis of the content of political parties, i.e., depending on presented 
issues and ideology. In other words, the rational voter prefers political parties to be 
more ideologically oriented. Consequently, this helped to uproot sectional divisions 
within political parties since, for example, a typical voter of the modern epoch does 
no longer want southern Democratic politicians to be conservative because they 
are from the South as in the mythologization era, but rather liberal because they 
are Democrats. In turn, the rationalization of the electorate made political parties 
more transparent for the office-seekers as, in the present party system, 
conservative politicians naturally prefer to join the Republican Party and the liberal 
ones the Democratic Party because it better reflects their world view but also 
enhances their chances of election into the office. Consequently, parties have 
grown more intrinsically cohesive since the 1970s, which inter alia helped to 
eliminate the conservative coalition that so much pestered the party-in-government 
in the era of “party debilitation.“ Coupled with the institutional reforms that were 
implemented in the 1970s, political parties now possess sufficient internal 
cohesion to carry out the programs they committed themselves to before the 
elections.
Unlike the second, third, and fourth party systems, when political parties may 
have wielded substantial power but were substantially irresponsible, and the fifth 
party system, when they were neither strong nor responsible, the present political 
parties have succeeded in mixing a unique combination of responsibility and 
strength. The 1970s simply saw the rise of a “superparty,“ one that is perfectly 
democratic but at the same time extremely powerful. Both conditions postulated in 
the 1950 Report of the American Political Science Association’s Committee on 
Political Parties about the responsible government have thus been met and its
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authors would probably have been extremely proud that the phenomenon of 
American political party not only persists but it even lives on in an extremely 
healthy manner. The present party system can be aptly termed as “the era of party 
revitalization,“ as American political parties seem to have taken the right road and 
that has made all the difference.
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Resumé
Cílem mé diplomové práce je analýza současných amerických stran a 
posouzení, zda se nacházejí ve stádiu úpadku či revitalizace. Za tímto účelem 
jsem do své práce zakomponoval též jejich historický vývoj, neboť objektivní 
obrázek o stavu současných amerických stran si lze učinit jen prostřednictvím 
jejich anamnézy. Jakožto hlavní pomůcku pro analýzu amerických stran používám 
tzv. Key-Soraufovu triádu, která rozděluje politickou stranu na tři komponenty, a to 
na stranu jako organizaci, stranu ve vládě a stranu v elektorátu. Strana jako 
organizace představuje samotné jádro politické strany a jejím hlavním cílem je 
mobilizace elektorátu za účelem úspěchu ve volbách. Strana ve vládě je tvořena 
konkrétními politiky, kteří prošli volebním sítem a byli zvoleni do určitého 
exekutivního či legislativního úřadu, ať už na celonárodní či státní úrovni. Strana 
v elektorátu je z celé Key-Soraufovy triády nejabstraktnější a nejméně čitelná, 
neboť zahrnuje voliče, kteří jsou větší či menší měrou svázáni s tou či onou 
stranou a svou náklonnost vyjadřují v lepším případě politickým aktivismem nebo 
účastí v primárních volbách, či v horším případě pouhou účastí ve volbách. Právě 
strana v elektorátu nejvíce odlišuje americké strany od těch evropských vzhledem 
к poměrně velkému stupni zangažovanosti amerického voliče na fungování strany 
jako organizace.
Podíváme-li se na blíže na historický vývoj amerických stran, pak zjistíme, že 
probíhal v cyklech, které je ohraničeny jevem, jenž je v americké politologii 
nazývaný jako „realignment“, což se dá stručně charakterizovat jako intenzivní 
přeskupení stranické příslušnosti v elektorátu. Volby, při kterých se objevuje tzv. 
realignment, mají přívlastek kritické a američtí politologové se většinou shodují na 
kritických volbách v letech 1860, 1896, 1932 a 1968. Vezmeme-li v potaz ještě tzv. 
předpartijní období, pak dostaneme šest stranických systémů: 1) federalisticko- 
republikánský systém (od začátku devadesátých let osmnáctého století až 
přibližně do roku 1815), 2) demokraticko-whigovský systém (od poloviny 
dvacátých let devatenáctého století až do poloviny padesátých let devatenáctého 
století), 3) první republikánsko-demokratický systém (od roku 1860 do roku 1896), 
4) druhý republikánsko-demokratický systém (od roku 1896 do roku 1932), 5)
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stranický systém New Dealu (od roku 1932 až do roku 1968) a 6) stranický systém 
navazující na New Deal (od roku 1968 až dosud).
V první stranickém systému v podstatě existovala jen jakási praforma 
politické strany vzhledem к de facto neexistenci strany jako organizace a strany 
v elektorátu. Strany tak fungovaly pouze ve vládě a spíše připomínaly 
aristokratické organizace, absolutně odtržené od voličů. V druhém stranickém 
systému již vznikla politická strana v pravém slova smyslu, neboť zde došlo 
к vytvoření základních stranických organizačních struktur а к masivní expanzi do 
elektorátu. Zatímco v prvním stranickém systému byly politické strany vnímány 
veskrze negativně, v druhém nastal kompletní obrat, neboť došlo doslova к jejich 
zbožštění. Příslušnost ke straně byla hlavně založena na nekritickém obdivu a 
měla tak převážně emocionální rozměr. Ve třetím stranickém systému došlo 
к vytvoření té podoby amerického systému, kterou známe až do dnes, a to 
republikánsko-demokratickou. Moc politických stran v tomto období neúnosně 
vzrostla, přičemž dosáhla až absolutistických rozměrů, nehledě na četné volební 
podvody. Naštěstí reakce demokraticky smýšlejících elementů v americké 
společnosti na sebe nenechala dlouho čekat a naplno se projevila ve čtvrtém 
stranickém systému ve formě progresivismu. Právě tento směr zasel první zrnka 
pozvolného oslabování a s tím související demokratizace amerických politických 
stran, ale je nutno podotknout, že jejich radikální reformace se dostavila až 
mnohem později
V další části diplomové práce se již detailně věnuji pátému a šestému 
stranickému systému, přičemž každé komponentě Key-Soraufovy triády je 
věnována vlastní kapitola. V pátém stranickém systému došlo ke značné 
diskrepanci ve straně ve vládě, obzvláště uvnitř Demokratické strany, kde na 
jedné stál silně konzervativní jih a na druhé liberálně smýšlející sever, což může 
evokovat reminiscence na americkou občanskou válku. Nepřekonatelné 
ideologické rozdíly vedly к vytvoření tzv. konzervativní koalice, kdy jižní demokraté 
velmi často hlasovali s republikány, aby zabránili přijetí legislativy týkající se 
občanských práv, což velmi destabilizovalo Demokratickou stranu. Šestý stranický 
systém přinesl znatelnou změnu, neboť došlo pod vlivem strany v elektorátu ke 
značné polarizaci politických stran a s tím spojenému zvýšení vnitřní jednoty. 
Strany nenávratně opustily svou často se překrývající střední pozici na ideologické 
škále, kterou tak dlouho zaujímaly, a Demokratická strana se přimkla к liberalismu
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a Republikánská ke konzervatizmu. Pokud к tomuto jevu přidáme strukturální 
opatření, které obě stany implementovaly v sedmdesátých letech dvacátého století 
a které měly za cíl vytvořit příznivé prostředí pro realizaci vlastních programů, pak 
dostáváme relativně silnou současnou stranu ve vládě.
Až do šestého stranického systému byly politické strany spíše konfederací 
státních organizací s minimálním vlivem národní centrální stranické buňky. Každá 
státní organizace se tak vyznačovala značnou autonomií a téměř zde neexistovala 
jakákoliv koordinace mezi nimi. Pod vlivem sílících nepřátelských a bouřlivých 
reakcí, kterými elektorát začal dávat najevo svoji nespokojenost s přetrvávajícím 
arogantním chováním politických stran, došlo к podstatné restrukturalizaci strany 
jako organizace. Aby byly politické strany efektivnější a pružnější v reakcích na 
vůli voličů, bylo nutno vytvořit silnější celonárodní stranické centrum. Obě dvě 
strany si vybraly jinou cestu. Zatímco demokraté šli cestou procedurální reformy, 
postavenou na implementaci různých standardů, republikáni vsadili na organizační 
reformu, kdy si centrum podmanilo státní organizace tím, že je zahrnulo službami 
a peněžními zdroji. Jak se ukázalo, republikánská cesta byla o hodně úspěšnější a 
demokratům nezbylo než úspěšný model jejich soka okopírovat. Díky těmto 
reformám vznikly nesmírně silné celonárodní organizace, které nemají v americké 
politické historii obdoby. V šestém stranické systému se též začal objevovat nový 
typ voleb, který se nezaměřuje už na stranu, ale na kandidáty, jakožto důsledek 
změněné dynamiky společnosti. I když strana formálně ustoupila do pozadí, tak si 
stále uchovala vliv na kandidáta, neboť ten stále potřebuje její zdroje a služby, 
které v takovém rozsahu může poskytnou jenom ona.
I strana v elektorátu si prošla v druhé polovině dvacátého století dynamickým 
vývojem. Zatímco dříve byla stranická příslušnost určována spíše emočními 
složkami osobnosti, tak v šedesátých letech dvacátého století došlo к vytvoření 
nové formy vazby к politickým stranám, a to na kognitivní úrovni. Dříve měla 
politická strana monopol na politické informační zdroje, ale pod vlivem medializace 
a větší vzdělanosti společnosti tento monopol ztratila. Následkem toho může 
politická informace к voliči proudit i nestranickým kanály, přičemž ten nyní 
disponuje lepším schopnostmi pro nakládání s touto informací než v minulosti. 
Jeho příslušnost к politické straně je o hodně flexibilnější a nemá tak hluboké 
kořeny jak v předchozích stranických systémech. Volič analyzuje výkonnost 
politických stran a podle toho se rozhoduje, do jaké investuje svůj hlas. I když se
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v sedmdesátých letech zdálo, že dochází к odcizení voličů od politických stran a 
к mizení stranických pout, tak tento jev v osmdesátých letech ustal a strana 
v elektorátu začala postupně ale jistě posilovat.
I když některé škarohlídské hlasy tvrdí opak, tak současné americké politické 
strany rozhodně neupadají. Možná jsou slabší než v 19. století, ale za to jsou o 
hodně zodpovědnější a demokratičtější, a právě vtom spočívá jejich síla a 
revitalizace. Co víc, politickým stranám se podařilo zastavit propad z pátého 
stranického systému a ve srovnání s ním se veškeré tři komponenty Key- 
Soraufovy triády nacházejí ve stádiu rozkvětu. Americká politická strana prostě 
žije dál, a to o hodně zdravěji než kdy předtím.
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Bibliographic analysis
According to Epstein, American political science has been mainly influenced 
by two groups of political thinkers: defenders of indigenous institutions and 
advocates of responsible government. The former group rejected implementation 
of any foreign political assets and claimed that political parties had to reflect the 
specific context of the United States. The followers of this doctrine, such as A. 
Lawrence Lowell, Herbert Agar, and most importantly V.O.Key, Jr., preferred 
political parties to be largely decentralized, rather non-ideological, non-cohesive in 
the government and with limited mass membership. The latter group, featuring 
James MacGregor Burns and especially E. E. Schattschneider, very much 
denounced traditional party organizations and called for greater collective 
responsibility of political parties, which, according to them, should strive for 
increased inner cohesiveness and greater responsiveness to the electorate.1
However, the inclusion of V. O. Key Jr. under the group of defenders of 
indigenous institutions is somewhat tricky as his work is too complex and very 
much reflects the schizophrenia of American political parties. Some of his ideas 
even classify him into the responsible government category as he advocated 
strengthening of political parties and increase of their efficiency, yet without 
implementation of foreign assets and increase in mass membership, and hence he 
is rather affiliated with the first group. In his classical work Southern Politics in 
State and Nation (1949), he heavily criticizes one-party politics in the South 
because it conserves the status quo and does not generate any incentives for 
change. In his other famous book, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (1964), 
V.O. Key, Jr. expresses the assumption that greater accountability and 
responsibility of political parties can be achieved only through their greater 
competitiveness. According to him, the degeneration of party organizations in the 
first half of the twentieth century occurred as a result of introduction of direct 
primary elections, which degraded the interparty competition to the level of 
personalities. In other words, he advocates traditional political parties, claiming 
that, if properly organized and competitive, they suit well the American 
environment.
1 Epstein, Leon D. 1986. Political Parties in the American Mold. Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, pp. 23-37
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Unlike defenders of indigenous institutions, E. E: Schattschneider rejected 
the idea that the main functions of American political parties should be merely to 
reflect diversity of interests. Within the electorate, he identified a distinct majority 
that parties should strive to represent. Also, in his masterpiece Party Government 
(1942), Schattschneider emphasizes egalitarianism and urges political parties to 
be more socially responsible as he thinks that business elites exercise excessive 
influence on party agenda. Interestingly, in this book, Schattschneider does not 
approve of Progressive reforms based upon democratization of political parties, 
and, similarly to V.O. Key, Jr., clings to the assumption that vigorous competition 
suffices to achieve the party revitalization. Also, Schattschneider proposes to 
create a national leadership, independent of state and local organizations, as, 
according to him, decentralization very much prevents responsible government 
from being operative.
In order to counter the continuing crisis of American politics, a group of 
political scholars decided to establish the American Political Science Association’s 
Committee on Political Parties, under Schattschneider’s chairmanship, which 
introduced more concrete prerequisites for implementation of the responsible party 
government in its 1950 Report. The Report basically calls for a strengthened role 
of national party committees and conventions, in order to make party policy more 
coherent and coordinated. It also finally acknowledges the mechanism of direct 
primaries as a method of selection candidates, however, it gives preference to a 
closed type of primaries, with participation limited to political activists. By 
postulating this, Schattschneider abandoned his concept of interparty competition 
being a sole means in achieving the responsible party government as this could be 
accomplished also by another mechanism, i.e., by enhancement of intraparty 
democracy and more extensive inclusion of the politically aware electorate into the 
functioning of party-as-organization.
Whereas the literature on political parties before the 1970s dealt rather with 
the function of political parties and their possible reformation, after the 1970s, it 
focused mainly on assessing party strength. As a result, two irreconcilable camps 
of political scientists appeared, one advocating the thesis of party decline, while 
the other one heralding party resurgence. One of the earliest representatives of 
the former group is Walter Dean Burnham, who in his classical work Critical 
Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (1970), expresses profound
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doubts about the future viability of democracy in the United States due to the 
continued decline of party efficacy in addressing voters. Burnham’s findings were 
elaborated upon by Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik., who in 
their noted study The Changing American Voter (1976) argue that the electorate 
has made “a great leap forward,“ which includes more sophisticated handling of 
political information and greater utilization of ideological thinking. However, such 
“awakening“ of the American voter sharply clashes with the unpreparedness of 
American parties to reflect these changes, which results in growing dissatisfaction 
with political parties. It should be noted that The Changing American Voter is an 
allusion to The American Voter (1960), which is a seminal study on voting 
behavior by Angus Campbell et al. It basically established methodology in 
analyzing the electorate, yet many of its findings have proved inaccurate over 
time. The dissatisfaction theory was refuted by findings of another defender of the 
party decline, Martin Wattenberg, who in his famous book The Decline of 
American Political Parties: 1952-1984 (1986) postulates that political parties, 
rather than being antagonized by voters, have become largely irrelevant to them 
as a result of the rise of candidate-centered elections.
Another famous study about the changing American party-in-the-electorate 
entitled Transformations of the American Party System (1975) by Everett Carll 
Ladd, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley, stands somewhere aside from the traditional 
party decline doctrine as it assumes rather neutral attitude towards the 
consequences of this change. In this book, they deal with the phenomenon of 
vanishing die-hard partisans and increased electoral volatility as a result of 
profound transformations taking place in the American society. In addition, they 
analyze the reasons of the shift from the once one-party South to a relatively 
bipartisan regional unit.
After the gloomy 1970s, the 1980s saw the rise of more optimistic prospects 
about American parties. In their book The Party Goes On: The Persistence of the 
Two-Party System in the United States (1985), Xandra Kayden and Eddie Mahe 
Jr. demonstrate that American parties do not collapse but has rather regained 
vigor. Also, according to them, they have largely changed their function because 
they are no longer predominantly structures that organize the electorate but rather 
agencies offering services to candidates. In a similar fashion, Larry Sabato in The 
Party’s Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for America's Future (1988)
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celebrates the development of political organizations at the beginning of the 
1980s, namely their unprecedented strengthening at the national level. 
Nevertheless, he also warns against their becoming mere service agencies to 
candidates, which would entail excessive increase in independence of party 
affiliation.
Whereas the two aforementioned books deal with revitalization of party 
organizations, David W. Rohde in his excellent study Parties and Leaders in the 
Postreform House (1991) traces the renewed strength of the party-in-government. 
According to him, the realignment of electoral forces in the 1960s contributed to 
attenuation of intraparty sectional divisions and increased polarization of political 
parties, while such electoral changes became subsequently reflected in greater 
homogeneity of House Democrats. Also, the institutional reforms from the 1970s 
implemented by both parties helped to substantially decrease the influence of 
party dissidents, and, as a result, the consensus in political parties is much greater 
than it used to be in the fifth party system.
All the listed books evaluating rise or decline of political parties deal 
predominantly only with one segment of the Key-Sorauf triad. However, Aldrich’s 
book called Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in 
America (1995) synthetizes all three components and presents one of the most 
complex studies on American political parties ever written. In addition to evaluation 
of the post-World War II political parties, Aldrich also observes their development 
from formation in the 1790s to the Civil War and analyzes three basic issues that 
every political party faces in democracy: how to regulate access to public offices, 
how to mobilize voters and how to win and maintain majorities to accomplish the 
set goals once in office. His evaluation of contemporary parties is based upon the 
argument that the onset of candidate-centered elections did not hamper them at all 
and, on the contrary, now they are revitalized, with highly effective governing 
abilities and increased level of polarization.
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